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Abstract 
This paper draws on a longitudinal interpretive case study to develop a theoretical model of how 
actions by people across an organization co-evolve strategy and structure in order to realize a 
mandated radical change. Mandated change, imposed by a powerful external actor, extends 
understanding of the dynamics of radical change. While other studies examine how unintended 
consequences shape the way radical change is realized, under mandated change actors focus on 
bringing about the change in ways that will be, collectively, considered to realize the intended 
mandate. Our study, grounded in a practice approach to how actions bring about radical change, 
identifies three different action cycles (performing action cycles, reinforcing action cycles, and 
reflecting action cycles). Shifts in cycles are triggered by unintended consequences that escalate 
into breakdowns. Cumulative cycles, arising from the escalation of unintended consequences that 
lead to breakdowns, are necessary for bringing about a mandated change in strategy and structure. 
Following breakdown, actors switch to reflecting actions in which they consider the underlying 
intent of the mandate and how to modify the espoused strategy and structure to bring about that 
intent.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Our paper shows how actions by senior, middle and frontline managers co-evolve strategy 
and structure in order to realize a mandated radical change. Alignment between strategy and 
structure has been considered critical since Chandler’s (1962) study showing that a divisional 
structure enabled firms with a diversification strategy to dominate the competitive environment. 
Radical change, a rapid and simultaneous, discontinuous shift in the firm’s strategic orientation, 
such as its products, markets, and ways of competing, and in its associated organizational activities 
(Tushman & Romanelli 1985), is a particularly critical point in the alignment of strategy and 
structure. It is a time when the two move together rapidly and simultaneously (Mintzberg, 1990), 
disrupting the existing strategy-structure alignment (e.g. Amis et al, 2004; Tushman & Romanelli, 
1985), with potentially damaging implications for organizational performance (Gulati & Puranam, 
2009). Yet few studies discuss how strategy and structure change together over time (Mintzberg, 
1990). Rather, most studies examine the unintended consequences of radical change, such as lags 
between strategic and structural change (Amburgey & Dacin, 1994; Greenwood & Hinings, 1988), 
oscillations of strategy and structure (Amis et al, 2004; Greenwood & Hinings, 1993), and 
structural reversals of strategic change (Mantere et al, 2012).  
We argue that radical change not only presents an appropriate context through which to 
explore how strategy and structure move together, but that doing so requires us to view radical 
change as a dynamic process that people enact (Langley et al, 2013; Tsoukas & Chia, 2002). 
Adopting a practice perspective, we conceptualize construction of change in strategy and structure 
as a social ordering of organizational arrangements that shape and are shaped by people’s actions 
(Bartunek, 1984; Jarzabkowski, 2008; Orlikowski, 2000; Ranson et al, 1980). This approach directs 
our attention to how people act within organizations, and facilitates a theoretical understanding of 
the constitutive role of such actions in constructing the social order of organizations (Feldman & 
Orlikowski, 2011: 1240). Critically, practice theorizing points to the recursive nature of action and 
social order (Giddens, 1984), within which actions are guided by the espoused changes in strategy 
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and structure, even as those actions enact the change that is ultimately realized (Rerup & Feldman, 
2011).  
Our paper examines a simultaneous shift of strategy and structure during a mandated radical 
change, meaning a change, often imposed by a powerful actor, with which an organization must 
comply or face sanctions (Rodriguez et al, 2007). Under a mandate, espoused changes to strategy 
and structure are particularly influential in shaping actions (Oakes, Townsend & Cooper, 1988; 
Rodriguez, Langley, Beland & Denis, 2007; Stiem, 1981), as people consciously endeavor to enact 
the specific strategy and structure set out in that mandate. In our case, a rapid and radical 
simultaneous shift in strategy and structure had to be delivered to tight deadlines as part of a 
mandated, legally-binding regulatory framework that had been strategically negotiated by senior 
managers of an organization, Telco.  
Telco is in a very unique strategic position. ... We get very heavily regulated around 
areas where we believe we have a bottleneck and hold the monopoly; that is, the 
distribution network. A key aspect of that is to set up a structure that we actually work 
very hard in enabling competition to occur, through the provision of our bottleneck 
services and significant market power services to external customers and 
communications providers, in an equal-handed way [via a separate division, 
AccessCo], so that competition flourishes in our retail space and then we get 
deregulated in that space. That’s our overall strategy. (Retail Divs Manager, Interview) 
 
We study how people’s actions bring about this mandated and radical shift in strategy and 
structure, tracking the process in real-time from its inception to the strategic review at 28 months 
when the regulator agreed that the mandate had been met. Our findings reveal how efforts by 
actors throughout the organization to perform the espoused strategy and structure (ESS) had 
unintended consequences. However, unlike in other studies (e.g. Balogun & Johnson, 2004; 2005; 
Balogun et al, 2015a; Rerup & Feldman, 2011; Sillince et al, 2012; Sonenshein, 2010), managers 
could not allow these unintended consequences to shape the change process. Rather, knowing that 
they had to deliver the mandate, they initially engaged in reinforcing cycles of action, thereby 
exacerbating the unintended consequences until the change process broke down. Such 
breakdowns triggered a different cycle of reflecting actions in which top managers engaged with 
 3
employees throughout the organization and with the regulator about how to modify the ESS whilst 
continuing to conform to the mandate. This reflecting action cycle enabled modification of the 
ESS as actors sought to work out what actions were consistent with the principles or ‘spirit’ of the 
mandate.  
We draw these findings together in a conceptual framework that highlights breakdowns as 
enabling triggers in the dynamic process of co-evolving strategy and structure in order to realize a 
mandated radical change. Initial performing action cycles lead to unintended consequences that are 
further compounded through reinforcing action cycles. Escalation of these unintended consequences 
leads to breakdowns that are critical because they enable managers to shift to reflecting action cycles in 
which the ESS is recognized as imperfectly suited to the mandate and, hence, modified to align 
more closely with the intent of the mandate. Drawing on our practice lens, we theorize these cycles 
as different modes of action (Giddens, 1984; Seidl & Hendry, 2003; Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2011) 
through which actors construct the relationships between strategy and structure in producing the 
radical change (Feldman & Orlikowski, 2011; Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2011).  
Our study makes four contributions. First, we extend understanding of how breakdowns 
shape the processual dynamics of radical change. We argue that, in the context of mandated 
change, breakdowns (Lok & de Rond, 2013; Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2011) are necessary triggers for 
a shift to reflective action, in which actors are able to consider the intent behind the mandate and 
how to best realize it (see Giddens, 1979: 24; 1984: 8; Hendry & Seidl, 2003; Sandberg & Tsoukas, 
2011). Second, we show that the unintended consequences of action do not necessarily lead to 
deviations from, or reinterpretations and failures of the change initiative (e.g. Balogun & Johnson, 
2004; Mantere et al, 2012; Rerup & Feldman, 2011). Rather, they can support realizing a change 
against its higher-level objectives as intended. Third, our study of managerial actions across levels 
of the organization, allows us to build on existing studies of managerial strategizing roles (e.g. 
Floyd & Lane, 2000; Rouleau & Balogun, 2011), in particular extending understanding about top 
managers as not only designers of change but also change recipients (e.g. Balogun et al, 2015a). 
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Fourth, we go beyond existing studies that examine how people enact strategic change (e.g. 
Balogun & Johnson, 2004; Balogun et al, 2015a; 2015b; Wiedner et al, 2017) by giving equal 
emphasis to how structural change and strategic change co-evolve within people’s actions (Floyd 
et al, 2011; Pye & Pettigrew, 2006).  
THEORETICAL FRAMING 
Radical change in strategy & structure. Alignment between strategy and structure is 
critical for organizational performance (e.g. Chandler, 1962; Keats & O’Neill, 2006). Strategy is 
defined according to a firm’s competitive orientation and associated strategic objectives at the 
corporate and business unit levels (Kaplan & Norton, 1996, 2007), while structure concerns the 
divisional grouping of roles within organizations (Gulati & Puranam, 2009; March & Simon, 1958; 
Nadler & Tushman, 1997) and lines of interaction between horizontal and vertical groups (Gulati 
& Puranam, 2009; Mintzberg, 1993). 
The relationship between strategy and structure is brought into particularly sharp relief at 
times of radical change, when the two are disrupted and move simultaneously (Mintzberg, 1990), 
with potentially damaging implications for performance if realignment cannot be achieved. Radical 
change is defined as a rapid, simultaneous and discontinuous shift in the firm’s strategic orientation 
and its associated organizational activities (Tushman & Romanelli 1985). It involves a time-
consuming shift in roles, responsibilities, skills, power relationships, control systems, lines of 
authority through which organizational members interact, and managerial interpretations (Amis, 
Slack & Hinings, 2004; Balogun & Johnson, 2004; Greenwood & Hinings, 1993; Gulati & 
Puranam, 2009; Hall & Saias, 1980, Huff, 1982; McKinley & Scherer, 2000; Romanelli & Tushman, 
1994). Such rapid and simultaneous shifts are challenging, as the new structure often lags the 
intended strategic changes (Amburgey & Dacin, 1994), typically because managers remain wedded 
to existing ways of interacting through known groupings and linkages (Gulati & Puranam, 2009). 
Thus it is not enough to merely announce the new strategy. While some studies assume 
that enacting the new strategy involves a largely non-problematic allocation of particular groups, 
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technologies and tasks in order to enhance efficiency and effectiveness in delivering the strategy 
(e.g. Chandler, 1962), people’s activities within these new structural groupings may not match their 
intended strategic purposes (Amburgey & Dacin, 1994). As they enact the strategy and structure, 
managers reinterpret and modify the espoused changes (Balogun & Johnson, 2004; 2005; Rerup 
& Feldman, 2011; Sonenshein, 2010), or work around them (e.g. Bertels, Howard-Grenville & 
Pek, 2016; Pollock, 2005; Tyre & Orlikowski, 1994), often accompanied by power struggles 
(Balogun et al, 2011; Wiedner et al, 2017) and conflict (Floyd & Lane, 2000; Lê & Jarzabkowski, 
2015; Wooldridge & Floyd, 1989) that generate unintended consequences. For example, Wiedner 
et al (2017) show how doctors used their medical knowledge to control resources in ways that 
redistributed power, ultimately altering both the health service’s strategic change initiative and the 
structures put in place to enable it. Radical change in strategy and structure is thus difficult 
(Amburgey & Dacin, 1994; Bartunek et al, 2011; Hoskisson & Johnson, 1992; Tushman & 
Romanelli, 1985), as the espoused change is often reinterpreted, modified or even reversed in the 
course of being enacted by people.  
Understanding radical change as a process that people enact, rather than a shift from one 
state to another, involves a particular ontological perspective. Many existing studies have viewed 
strategy and structure as entities or ‘things’ that exist outside the practices and processes of those 
who enact them (Feldman, 2016; Feldman & Orlikowski, 2011; Langley, Smallman, Tsoukas & 
Van de Ven, 2013). Consequently, much research has sought to understand the changes in these 
entities between Time 1 and Time 2, focusing on reorientation at T2 as the outcome of change 
(e.g. Amburgey & Dacin, 1994; Amis et al, 2004; Romanelli & Tushman, 1994; Tushman & 
Romanelli, 1985). Hence, the way people’s actions shape the actual process of reorienting are not 
examined in detail. Even studies that examine the broad processual patterns that accompany such 
shifts (e.g. Amis et al, 2004; Greenwood & Hinings, 1988; 1993) focus primarily on the outcome 
at T2, rather than on explaining how the emerging configurations are constructed within the 
actions of the people implementing them. Intriguingly, these studies show that such changes are 
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non-linear, with oscillations between strategy-structure configurations during which radical change 
is often not achieved (e.g. Amburgey & Dacin, 1994; Amis et al, 2004; Greenwood & Hinings, 
1988). The attempted shift from one state to the next clearly involves much activity. We thus turn 
to complementary studies that adopt a different ontology, going inside the black box of what people 
actually do when a rapid, simultaneous disruption of strategy and structure are proposed.  
A number of studies examine, implicitly, how the enactment of structure shapes strategic 
change. For example, structurally assigned roles and responsibilities demarcate the types of 
strategizing activities and participation in strategy-making expected from top, middle and 
operational managers (Floyd & Lane, 2000; Mantere & Vaara, 2008). Such roles may come into 
conflict at times of strategic change when the control systems, administrative procedures and 
power relationships through which strategic actions are coordinated are in flux (Floyd & Lane, 
2000; Jarzabkowski & Balogun, 2009). Moreover, the specific tasks performed by people with 
different functional expertise and organizational roles shape the way strategic change unfolds 
(Mantere, 2008). In the process of realizing strategy, different actors operate from different 
structural positions: engineers make sense of strategy (Balogun & Johnson, 2004; 2005; Regnér, 
2003), sales people narrate it (Rouleau, 2005), frontline workers embody it (Balogun, Best & Lê, 
2015), and project workers temporally orient to it (Kaplan & Orlikowski, 2013). While these actors 
have varying capacity to directly influence the espoused strategy (Balogun et al, 2011; Mantere & 
Vaara, 2008), their actions, undertaken from their different hierarchical and functional positions 
within the organization, have important consequences for its enactment. Yet these studies do not 
explicitly examine how action shapes the co-evolution of strategy and structure, up-down-and-
across organizations, as different employees perform change tasks according to their specific roles 
and responsibilities and, in doing so, enact the new strategy.  
This emphasis on action is particularly important in the context of mandated radical 
change. Much literature examines how people’s actions generate unintended consequences as they 
reinterpret and modify the espoused change (e.g. Balogun & Johnson, 2004; 2005; Balogun et al, 
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2015a; Mantere et al, 2012; Rerup & Feldman, 2011; Sillince et al, 2012; Sonenshein, 2010), or 
engage in workarounds through which they undermine or sidestep the change (Bertels et al, 2016; 
Pollock, 2005; Tyre & Orlikowski, 1994). Yet in the context of a mandated change, defined as one 
with which an organization must comply or face sanctions, often because it is imposed by a 
powerful external actor, such as a government or regulator (Rodriguez et al, 2007), there may be 
less leeway for modification, reinterpretation, or tolerance of unexpected outcomes (e.g. 
Rodriguez, et al, 2007; Stiem, 1981; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983), particularly if the mandate is legally-
binding. However, while some studies examine externally-imposed change (e.g. Denis et al, 2001; 
Oakes et al, 1998; Wiedner et al, 2017), little attention has been focused on how a mandated change 
shapes action or how that action shapes understanding that the mandate has (or has not) been 
realized. Hence mandated radical change provides an opportunity for theoretical insight into how 
actors “work out” structure and strategy and deal with the unintended consequences that arise, 
given that they are constrained in modifying or working around the espoused change.  
A practice perspective. The practice turn in strategy and organization theory (see 
Burgelman et al, 2018; Feldman & Orlikowski, 2011; Jarzabkowski et al, 2016; Orlikowski, 2000; 
Seidl & Whittington, 2014; Vaara & Whittington, 2012) is informed by various social practice 
theories that broadly examine interaction between action and social structure (e.g. Bourdieu, 1990; 
Giddens. 1984; Schatzki, 2002). In order to avoid confusion between the organization theory terms 
‘strategy’ and ‘structure’ and the practice theoretical term ‘social structure’, we conceptualize 
strategy and structure as the unfolding social ordering of organizational arrangements within the 
actions of organizational members (Feldman & Orlikowski, 2011; Jarzabkowski, 2004; Nicolini, 
2013; Whittington, 2006). A practice-theoretical framework seeks to explain the consequentiality 
of people’s actions in three ways; empirically in what they actually do, theoretically in how these 
actions iteratively shape and are shaped by the social ordering of organizations, and ontologically 
in the premise that what we take to be organizational ‘reality’ – such as the patterns of collective 
practice that we label strategy or structure – is produced within multiple people’s actions 
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distributed across time and space (Feldman & Orlikowski, 2011; Giddens, 1984; Schatzki, 2002). 
Such an approach, while favoring action in constructing social order, rejects dualisms such as 
agency and structure or cognition and action, in order to focus on their mutual constitution 
(Feldman & Orlikowski, 2011: 1240-1243). Thus, actors’ actions cannot be separated from the 
changing social ordering of strategy and structure produced by them. Tsoukas and Chia (2002) 
refer to this as a process of “becoming,” urging scholars not to examine change as a particular 
state or outcome, but to focus instead on how social order is brought about continuously within 
people’s actions (see also Langley et al, 2013).  
From a practice perspective, we need to move beyond the canonical definitions of strategy 
and structure presented above, to examining the inseparable and mutually constitutive actions 
involved in strategizing and structuring. Strategizing is defined as the flow of actions and 
interactions by multiple actors and the practices that they draw upon as they enact the 
organization’s strategic objectives (Floyd & Lane, 2000; Jarzabkowski, 2008; Jarzabkowski et al, 
2007; Johnson et al, 2003). Structuring is defined as the ongoing flow of action in which actors 
construct and reconstruct the specified grouping and linking that comprises the organizational 
chart (Barley, 1986; Bartunek, 1984; Gulati & Puranam, 2009; Ranson, Greenwood & Hinings, 
1980). Such definitions indicate the entanglement of the two concepts as actors enact structure in 
the enacting of strategy and vice versa: “two interwoven threads, not unlike a double helix, which 
twist and turn, bringing each to the foreground from time to time, as they work in tandem to bring 
about change” (Pye & Pettigrew, 2006: 587). Thus, though separate actions may be associated with 
strategizing and structuring, a single action may also enact strategy and structure simultaneously. 
For instance, the actions of a sales manager in delivering sales targets constitutes strategizing work 
as it contributes to enacting core strategic objectives associated with revenue and growth, and 
simultaneously constitutes structuring work as the sales manager enacts her role within a particular 
structural function and hierarchical level (e.g. Rouleau, 2005).  
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While the mutual construction of strategy and structure is a dynamic and unfolding 
process, practice theorizing also points to the difficulty of change, as actions are recursively guided 
by social order while also producing it (Giddens, 1984). This recursiveness predisposes stability. 
Yet action is also generative (Feldman & Orlikowski, 2011; Feldman & Pentland 2003; 
Jarzabkowski, 2004). That is, action is never so ‘over-socialized’ that it conforms only to the social 
ordering instantiated by it (Bucher & Langley, 2016; Howard-Grenville, 2005). Rather, each action 
is an ‘effortful accomplishment’ (Pentland & Rueter, 1994) that contains within it the potential for 
variations that may generate change, particularly as different actors construct and reconstruct the 
social order according to their own local situations (see, for example, Bucher & Langley, 2016; 
Feldman & Pentland, 2003; Howard-Grenville, 2005; Kaplan & Orlikowski, 2013; Salvato & 
Rerup. 2018).  
Our study of mandated radical change draws on these practice-theoretical concepts that 
have informed the study of organizational structures (e.g. Barley, 1986; Bartunek, 1984; 
Jarzabkowski et al, 2012; Ranson et al, 1980), strategy (e.g. Jarzabkowski, 2008; Kaplan & 
Orlikowski, 2013; Rouleau, 2005), and routines (e.g. Feldman & Pentland, 2003; Howard-
Grenville, 2005; Rerup & Feldman, 2011). For the purposes of this paper, we follow Rerup & 
Feldman (2011), who distinguish between what is espoused at the start of a change initiative and 
what is actually enacted within people’s shifting performances over time. We suggest that the 
espoused strategy and structure (ESS) articulated at the outset of a mandated radical change, often as a 
written plan and organizational chart (Spee & Jarzabkowski, 2017), are a guideline that shapes the 
multiple actions performed by actors around the organization. Such actions in various parts of the 
organization come together and collectively enact the social order that is termed the mandated 
change. Hence the mandate is nothing except what people enact. And yet, when that mandate is 
imposed by a powerful external actor, it is also critical in shaping actions, and in the social ordering 
of organizational arrangements produced by those actions (see, for example, Oakes et al, 1998). 
Mandated change thus provides a critical context in which to study the mutual constitution of 
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strategy and structure during radical change. Building from this theoretical framing, we examine: 
‘How do people’s actions bring about a mandated radical change of strategy and structure?’.  
METHOD 
We undertook a longitudinal, real-time case study (Lee, 1999; Miles & Huberman, 1994) 
of Telco, a communications provider, as it enacted a radical change that had been mandated by 
the regulator and was legally binding. This is a theoretically salient case of radical change in strategy 
and structure, as defined by Tushman and Romanelli (1985) and Greenwood and Hinings (1988; 
1993), and has four key characteristics. First, the change was radical not just because of its sheer 
extent and complexity, but also because – having never been attempted in this industry or in any 
other country – there was no template for delivery. This incredibly complex change would affect 
all of Telco’s key products, services, systems, and processes and have implications across all levels 
of the organization. Second, the change involved a simultaneous and rapid shift in the corporate 
strategy and organizational structure. Third, it was mandated; hundreds of legally binding targets 
and deadlines were outlined in a formal change document that specified many elements of the new 
strategy and structure. Finally, the change had to be delivered as intended, with penalties for failure 
to deliver on the various targets. The overall success would be evaluated by the regulator after 28 
months. Any deviations from the radical change would need to be formally negotiated by the most 
senior corporate managers, thereby assigning them additional responsibility for articulating 
strategic intent and setting strategic direction (e.g. Floyd & Lane, 2000). Yet the Regulator made it 
clear that the terms of the change were non-negotiable and alterations would only be approved in 
exceptional circumstances. We now provide an overview of the radical change in strategy and 
structure at Telco. 
Case Overview: Radical Change at Telco. In extended strategic negotiations with the 
regulator and key industry stakeholders, Telco committed to a radical change known as the Mandate. 
The new strategy and the agreed structural activities designed to support it were documented in 
great detail in the Mandate guidance document, providing a framework for the change, which 
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included specific deadlines for key deliveries. The legally-binding nature of the Mandate meant 
that failure to deliver would lead to seven figure financial penalties and possible recommendation 
to the Competition Commission that Telco be broken up and forced to sell its profitable 
distribution assets. The Mandate was signed by top managers at Telco, who were given 
responsibility for delivering the new strategy through a set of agreed structural activities.  
The key purpose of the Mandate was to create an independent industry supplier of 
equivalent products. This was to be met by a radical, overarching change. Telco, which was a 
vertically integrated telecommunications company that used its value chain to create competitive 
advantage for all of its business divisions, would separate its distribution network into a new 
division (AccessCo), which would supply all of industry on equal terms, without favoring Telco’s 
downstream retail divisions (RetailDivs). This agreement was quite strategic by Telco, as the new 
strategy would thus enable competition throughout the retail part of the industry, including 
RetailDivs. RetailDivs were to be free to compete vigorously in the retail space, while AccessCo 
was not to compete but rather to be the monopoly supplier of high quality products to all industry 
competitors.  It was thus a radical change to the firm’s own way of competing strategically, and 
also to the competitive dynamics of the entire national telecommunications industry. The specific 
terms of the mandate contained four key entwined elements: independence, industry supplier, 
equivalence, and products, each of which had specific structural and strategic implications. 
Independence. Independence between Telco’s distribution network, AccessCo, and its 
RetailDivs, was strategic because it let Telco retain ownership of the valuable distribution network. 
Independence would be met through strict structural separation of the divisions. The strategy, to 
ensure that AccessCo would not give competitive advantage nor let its decision-making be 
influenced by RetailDivs, came with a radical change in structure that separated the distribution 
network and assets into the new business division. This involved moving 30,000 employees, who 
had been embedded throughout the different Telco divisions, into the new division with a new 
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brand, logo, and buildings. AccessCo would remain under the corporate Telco structure but 
operate separately from the RetailDivs. 
Industry Supplier. The ‘industry supplier’ element of the Mandate was a new strategy, as 
AccessCo would have to supply distribution products and services directly to external industry 
retailers and their customers, making the competitive requirements of all industry retailers a core 
part of its new strategy.. This was a radical shift for Telco, as AccessCo had previously been 
integrated with and supplied to Telco. As an industry supplier. The Mandate meant converting the 
structure of a vertically integrated company, in which all divisions worked strategically for the 
competitive advantage of Telco as a whole, to one in which AccessCo would be virtually 
disintegrated.  
Equivalence. Equivalence was Telco’s new strategy to provide all of its network assets and 
services (the distribution side of the industry, of which it was sole owner) on an equal basis to all 
industry retailers, with no competitive advantage for its own retail businesses, RetailDivs. 
Structurally this would be implemented by standardizing information and products within 
AccessCo and providing them in the same way to all retailers, thus ensuring that no advantage was 
afforded to Telco’s RetailDivs. 
Products. Under the Mandate, there were three essential products that needed to be 
supplied strategically as equivalent products and services to all of industry. Each product, which 
had initially been provided as part of an integrated supply chain and not offered separately, had to 
be separated completely by specific deadlines so that it could be supplied by AccessCo to any 
industry retailer on equal terms. To support this change, specific sub-objectives for equivalence 
and independence were set for each of these products; these concerned developing prototypes of 
the product/service bundles, piloting them with different industry parties, and transferring 
specified numbers of customers to the new products. They also included deadlines for full 
realization (see Figure 1 for a timeline of key deadlines relating to Product A, B and C). 
This radical change meant that not only the corporate strategy, but also the structure, such 
 13
as reporting lines, control systems, and distribution of power and responsibility between particular 
roles, were all radically altered. And these changes had to be enacted as intended; any substantive 
shift from the espoused strategy and structure might constitute a breach in the Mandate and attract 
serious penalties. To support the radical change, the signing of the Mandate was prefaced with an 
extended period of internal and external consultation and communication. Throughout the 
company people referred to the “spirit” of the Mandate1 in their actions, as these illustrative data 
extracts show; “There are two aspects of the Mandate, there’s the written details and there’s a 
spirit, and we want to meet the spirit” (Senior manager, interview). As a divisional manager 
explained during a project meeting, “I was actually quite impressed by everybody I met in terms 
of their understanding of the Mandate. It’s not just how it affected their jobs, but actually how 
they understood the whole spirit and everything else.” Operational employees also considered the 
spirit in their tasks: “from a spirit perspective, given that these services are very much tied into the 
availability of these product functionalities, shall we keep them as a package and just do the extra 
work?” (Systems engineer, shadowing). Hence, while exogenously imposed, the Mandate was 
rapidly absorbed into the social ordering of Telco, as people gave meaning to it in their actions. 
--- Insert Figure 1 here --- 
Data Collection. Longitudinal qualitative data were collected over 28 months, tracing the 
change in real-time at the Corporate Centre and across all Telco divisions. This extensive field 
engagement produced a dataset consisting of 254 audio-recorded meeting observations, with 
associated fieldnotes, 130 audio-taped interviews with managers, 16 days of work shadowing, and 
over 1,500 documents pertaining to the delivery of the strategy and structure. In addition, the first 
author, who had prior research engagement with Telco throughout the policy formation that lead 
to the Mandate, underwent internal training to be awarded ‘special status’, a particular structural 
                                                 
1 The ‘spirit’ referred to the underlying principles that guided the Mandate. People within Telco believed that it was 
insufficient to simply meet the legal or technical elements of the Mandate, but that their actions also had to be aligned 
with its underlying principles, which they termed the ‘spirit’. This often required going above and beyond the ‘legal’ 
requirements of the change. 
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group who were allowed to span divisions. The second author did the code-of-practice training 
on the implications of the Mandate undertaken by most Telco staff. We complemented these data 
with pre- and post-meeting observations, informal discussions, feedback sessions, and social 
functions (see Miles & Huberman, 1994). Our research question and practice-based ontology 
required us to track the unfolding enacting of the radical change over time; we thus built our dataset 
around meeting observations. In particular, we followed all of the key weekly, fortnightly, and 
monthly meetings pertaining to the change, including meetings at the Corporate Centre 
(Implementation Board Meetings), in each division (Divisional Meetings), and specific product 
meetings (Product Meetings). These meetings allowed us to track people’s actions over time, 
gathering data on any changes to the ESS as they occurred.  
We interviewed key organizational members, particularly senior and middle managers 
involved in realizing the radical change, as well as some operational employees who were part of 
their project teams; generally, these people were also central to the meetings we observed. 
Interviews were used to enrich the storyline and flesh out details about how and why particular 
adaptations took place. The documents we collected included program and project updates relating 
specifically to the change, such as reports, PowerPoint slides, white papers, e-mails, and other 
communiques. We used these documents to triangulate findings from other sources and ensure 
that the timeline was accurate (Flick, 1992). These formal data sources were complemented with 
informal observations and discussions that enabled us to form a well-rounded understanding of 
the context and ask clarifying questions that facilitated our thinking. See Table 1 for a full 
breakdown of data sources in each category. 
--- Insert Table 1 here --- 
In line with publication etiquette, we acknowledge that some subsets of the above dataset 
have been used in other publications. These papers have addressed specific topics such as the 
disruption and re-coordination of a single product (Jarzabkowski, Le & Feldman, 2011), the effects 
of tension (Jarzabkowski, Le & Van de Ven, 2013; Le & Jarzabkowski, 2015) and the role of 
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humour (Jarzabkowski & Le, 2017). The context of a Telco and hence the products and some 
types of employees, such as engineers, are the same across all papers. However, the current paper 
is unique, as it draws the entire dataset together for the first time in order to explain the full nature 
of the radical change across the whole organization. In this process, we have oriented toward a 
new literature and have developed new concepts, which have not been the subject of any other 
publication with this dataset. Additionally, this different focus and wider dataset means that there 
are no overlapping quotes, vignettes or data extracts in this paper and any other publication. 
Coding & Analysis. Our analysis followed an iterative approach, moving between data 
and theory (Locke, Golden-Biddle & Feldman, 2008; Mantere & Ketokivi, 2013), applying various 
process analysis tools to progressively emerge theory from data (Jarzabkowski, Lê & Spee, 2017). 
In this section we explain the analytic constructs developed, which are summarized in Table 2. 
--- Insert Table 2 here --- 
First, we wrote a rich chronological case story of the mandated radical change (Geertz, 
1973; Langley, 1999), paying particular attention to how the espoused changes in strategy and 
structure unfolded. Initially we worked with the data from the group-level Implementation Board 
meetings, as these were weekly meetings that oversaw all elements of the change, allowing us to 
maintain chronological order and build an overarching story of the radical change (see Figure 1), 
which we then expanded to the full dataset. As we examined the data, we found that strategic and 
structural elements were entwined in practice (Pye & Pettigrew, 2006) as people engaged, 
iteratively, in actions that materialized their understanding of the strategy and structure that had 
been espoused. Consistent with our practice approach, we labelled these iterative actions, which 
began to enact the strategy and structure, performing action cycles; people’s iterative actions were 
performative in bringing about their understanding of the mandated changes in strategy and 
structure (Feldman & Orlikowski, 2011; Rerup & Feldman, 2011).  
Second, in examining the performative actions of people at various levels of the 
organization and how these came together to produce the change, we became aware of repeated 
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and serious breakdowns in the mandated change process. Iterating with the literature on 
breakdowns in people’s practice (e.g. Lok & de Rond, 2013; Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2011), we 
defined breakdowns in our data as an inability to continue with the radical change process; people 
literally could not deliver on a critical goal or meet a deadline. Curious about the origin and role of 
breakdowns in the change process, we started to build case stories around them. We moved 
backwards and forwards from specific breakdowns as the starting point in order to better 
understand how and why they arose and their consequences. Again, we anchored our work in the 
meeting data, developing a skeletal chronology of each breakdown before fleshing it out with 
additional observation, interview, and documentary data.  
Third, this analysis allowed us to discern a critical theme shared across breakdown stories. 
Breakdowns were associated with subtle shifts in the espoused strategy and structure (ESS). Such 
shifts essentially constituted modifications in how organizational actors understood what was 
being mandated through the change in strategy and structure and how this might best be achieved 
in practice. As the ESS had been designed specifically to deliver the legally-binding Mandate, any 
reinterpretation and modification was complex. Looking across our 28-month observation period, 
we identified four ways in which the ESS shifted, with these shifts being brought about, subtly, 
through the responses of actors to the breakdowns. We detail these shifts in Table 3 and explain 
them in the findings, where this table provides a helpful reference guide to the story.  
--- Insert Table 3 here --- 
Fourth, intrigued by these breakdowns and shifts, we tried to understand how they were 
being produced in people’s actions. Looking at the within-case dynamics, we noted that 
breakdowns arose each time actors’ efforts to meet the ESS generated unintended consequences 
– often quite micro things, such as not being able to enter houses to do repairs or not having the 
necessary information to transfer customers onto a product prototype –that prevented them from 
meeting some aspect of the mandated change. Seeking to explain why this occurred, we revisited 
our detailed chronological data. We observed that the performing action cycles through which 
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actors brought about their specific change tasks enacted the strategy and structure in a particular 
way that, while aligned to what had been espoused by top managers and embraced by employees 
throughout the organization as the ‘right’ way to realize the Mandate, actually obstructed it, thereby 
preventing them from meeting the legally binding objectives of the Mandate. 
Exploring these unintended consequences further, to understand why such micro actions 
in performing specific change tasks hindered the change process, we noted an additional set of 
actions. Specifically, organizational actors were aware of these unintended consequences and 
signaled this by escalating the problems they were experiencing upward. However, as the ESS was 
perceived to be consistent with the mandated change, the original performing actions were deemed 
in line with the Mandate and reinforced at multiple levels throughout the organization all the way 
to the top managers. Reinforcing action cycles thus kept actors performing the same actions and 
even increasing their effort to enact strategy and structure in this way. Reinforcing actions 
ultimately exacerbated the unintended consequences until breakdown occurred.  
Fifth, understanding the origin of breakdowns, we then sought to better understand how 
they lead to shifts in the ESS. We found that breakdowns were essential in prompting shifts, as 
they helped actors realize that the ESS, as currently enacted, was not delivering the change and 
had to be modified. Yet such modifications were not simple, and could not be allowed to evolve 
naturally, since this was a legally-binding mandated change. Looking carefully into these moments, 
we found that breakdowns prompted a reflecting action cycle. Here, people stopped trying to 
perform the ESS and instead engaged in different actions, such as deep dives and consultations 
with the regulator, questioning what was espoused and whether it enabled the ‘spirit’ of the 
Mandate. Such actions also generated reflection on and deeper understanding of the intent of the 
Mandate, from which they were able to come up with modifications to the ESS that they could 
enact to better meet that intent. Specifically, organizational actors modified either the strategic 
objectives or the structural arrangements or both in order to address the breakdown and continue 
enacting the radical change.  
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Drawing these analytical steps together, our findings demonstrate how the mandated 
change process unfolded, leading to a radical change that was realized largely as intended, with 
delivery of the high-level strategy and structure sufficient to gain approval at the 28-month 
Strategic Review, conducted by the regulator on behalf of industry and government. We explain 
and illustrate these processual dynamics in the findings, through a detailed case of one specific 
change task. We remind the reader that, for ease of reference, the key constructs used to tell the 
story are outlined in Table 2, with an overview of the key shifts in Table 3.  
FINDINGS 
Using a rich case story, we illustrate the iterative process in which: (1) the everyday actions 
taken by managers at different levels to perform the ESS have unintended consequences; (2) 
managers reinforce these unintended consequences as they confirm with their peers and superiors 
that existing actions are consistent with the Mandate; (3) the unintended consequences escalate 
until the change process breaks down; whereupon (4) top managers  reflect on the intent of the 
Mandate, and engage in new actions with others that modify the ESS; and that, hence (5) triggers 
managers at all levels to engage in further action cycles to perform the ESS. This iterative process 
unfolds over multiple tasks throughout the organization, cumulatively enabling Telco and its 
managers to ultimately realize the mandated change.  
Door-in-the-Face: Illustrative Case of Processual Dynamics 
We now explain these processual dynamics through a detailed explanation of a specific 
change task. While we can only present a single task due to space constraints, additional change 
tasks are presented in Table 4. Such tasks, occurring across all parts of the organization, share the 
same underlying processual dynamics. Cumulatively, these dynamics generate the ESS shifts 
through which the key aspects of the Mandate are realized (see Table 3).  
--- Insert Table 4 here --- 
The case we present focuses on AccessCo engineers, a structural group created to deliver 
the strategy of ‘industry supplier’, offering ‘equivalent’ services ‘independently’ from Telco. As a 
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new functional cluster within the separate AccessCo division, engineers were to supply network-
related services such as installations and repairs to all retailers, while operating independently from 
RetailDivs. Independence was the key to becoming an equivalent industry supplier, since industry 
would distrust any collaboration as disproportionally advantageous to RetailDivs. Hence, 
AccessCo engineers’ separate reporting structures and information systems ensured that 
RetailDivs could not gain any direct access that might compromise the engineers’ independence.  
1) Performing action cycle: Enacting the initial ESS generates unintended 
consequences. As the ESS of separating AccessCo into an independent business division in order 
to deliver the new strategy of equivalent industry supply had been explained in significant detail, 
people felt ready to perform it. At the corporate level, top managers articulated independence to 
internal and external stakeholders, explaining what it meant and why it was important to the 
success of Telco and the entire telecommunications industry. Such actions, which included taking 
the top 350 managers in the company away for a “town hall” meeting to discuss the ESS, equated 
structural separation with the strategy of enabling AccessCo to supply products and services 
independently to industry. Hence, the actions of top managers aimed to enact the strategic change 
through structural separation.  
At the divisional level, managers’ actions were producing separation within the multiple 
projects they were running. For example, in project meetings, divisional managers consistently 
explained that people in AccessCo were acting separately from other divisions. This meant that 
they should not be asked to work across boundaries or share information, and all employees should 
help perform this separation to support the new strategy of independent industry supply. At the 
same time, divisional managers developed distinct reporting lines and separated information 
systems and work processes, which helped to embed actions that performed structural separation. 
Consequently, there was little or no communication across functional boundaries.  
At the operational level actions also performed structural separation, including engineers 
wearing AccessCo branded uniforms and driving AccessCo vans. This everyday work of engineers 
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built upon actions at divisional and corporate levels and meant that the engineers acted separately, 
not referring to Telco as they provided services. By adhering to strict separation, Engineers were 
performing their part of the new strategy of independence from the competitive requirements of 
RetailDivs. We now zoom in on this level to better understand the dynamics of enacting the ESS 
in this way. Critically, one particular performative action emerged around how engineers 
introduced themselves when they were called to end-users’ homes to supply a service for any of 
their retail customers. When end-users opened the door, engineers announced that they were ‘from 
AccessCo.’ Hence they enacted the ESS by representing an independent AccessCo and supplying 
an industry service with no visible ties to Telco. 
While consistent with the ESS, this action had unintended consequences. In particular, 
end-users, who were unfamiliar with AccessCo, were reluctant to let AccessCo engineers enter 
their homes: “It’s not just a name change – It impacts everything we do! All the time people ask 
us ‘what is AccessCo?’ We never had these problems with Telco, because they trust Telco and just 
let us in. Now with AccessCo, sometimes people won’t see us at all” (Engineer, Shadowing). 
Hence, enacting the new engineering structure in this way delayed or prevented engineers from 
supplying services.  
2) Reinforcing Action Cycle: Unintended consequences escalate. Engineers, struggling 
to get into homes, verified with their peers that what they were doing was appropriate: “I’d like to 
just say that I’m from Telco, but I’d get fired for that” (Engineer, shadowing). His colleague agreed, 
referring to the Mandate: “Our competitors are just waiting for us to mess up. And then they’ll 
push to have Telco ripped apart.” They checked training material and decided what they were 
doing was right, despite the problems: “This is meant to put Telco through as much pain as 
possible” (Engineer, shadowing). Assuming it would simply take more time for people to get to 
know the AccessCo brand, engineers continued to explain that they were “from AccessCo,” 
thereby reinforcing structural separation and strategic independence from Telco within their 
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specific actions. However, as they continued to have trouble accessing end-user homes, they 
realized that they could not resolve the problem and passed the issue upward. 
Divisional managers examined their own actions, verifying that the engineering structure was 
indeed intended to be separate in order to ensure the strategy of an independent supply of 
engineering services to industry. Believing that engineers simply needed more time and training to 
perform the ESS effectively, divisional managers reinforced existing actions to underpin separation 
and  working without crossing divisional boundaries:  
“I think that we’ve still got a long way to go from a spirit [of the Mandate] point of 
view in translating the theory into a reality that’s meaningful for people in the areas 
that they operate in. Because people only really tend to take notice when it directly 
affects them. We’ve done an awful lot of work… right down to the Field Engineers, 
through paper communications, electronic communications, team meetings, 
induction programs, etc. And everything has a theme of the Mandate and 
independence running through it. But even though I think the awareness is quite 
high now, translating that into what it means for people on a day-to-day basis hasn’t 
happened yet. That takes time. And we’re just about to kick off the ‘Living the Spirit’ 
program to address this issue” (Senior AccessCo Regulatory Manager, Interview). 
 
For instance, the divisional managers held meetings and designed communications to 
reiterate the importance of having independent engineers. They provided additional training for 
engineers to underscore the structural separation of AccessCo. Supported by their divisional 
managers, engineers thus continued to perform the ESS, explaining that they were ‘from 
AccessCo’ and thereby escalating the unintended consequence of problematic access to end-user 
premises. This dynamic recurred over several months, perpetuating service problems. There were 
several rounds of engineer training, as divisional managers further reinforced their own actions 
aimed at helping engineers to “get better” at doing things in the “new AccessCo world” (Division 
manager, product meeting). Unable to resolve the service supply failure, which became increasingly 
critical, divisional managers passed the issue up the hierarchy. 
Corporate managers also ensured that the strategy of independent industry supply was enacted 
through structural separation. Indeed, they felt failure to gain access was proof of AccessCo being 
truly independent from RetailDivs. Their actions thus reinforced the status quo, emphasizing to 
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internal and external stakeholders that separation was important for independent supply. For 
example, corporate managers explained the engineers’ access difficulties at a wider industry 
meeting to demonstrate to external retailers that AccessCo was indeed acting independently: “We 
explained [to industry], ‘They’re [engineers] living it’” (Corporate manager, Meeting). Satisfied that 
they were performing the ESS and delivering the Mandate, they further underscored separation 
throughout the organization: “We had a top-level, personalized communication, with Callan 
putting his authority on it as the Chief Executive of the Group saying ‘this is absolutely the right 
thing to do and this is what we are doing’, and those messages were sent to every single person in 
the organization” (AccessCo senior manager, meeting). In short, their actions reinforced the 
existing way of performing the ESS across organizational levels. This escalated the unintended 
consequences, so that engineers struggled to supply service for some ten months. 
3) Breakdown arises from enacting strategy and structure as espoused. While 
delivering a strategy of independent industry supply, separation of the ‘AccessCo’ engineering 
division generated a breakdown. As change tasks are connected throughout an organization, the 
engineering service issues delayed the wider Telco change progress, forcing divisional managers to 
forgo or fail to implement some of the elements necessary to meet the ‘early release’ deadline for 
ProductB and jeopardizing the ‘mandatory use’ deadline for ProductA (see Figure 1). They were 
unable to achieve these product elements of the strategy because they could not get services 
installed because engineers were essentially ‘locked out’ of their sites of work. Each time an 
engineer was delayed or unable to complete their work, load accrued in the service schedule, until 
it became impossible for the engineers to ‘catch up’ on this workload (despite new hires). Rather 
than being a supplier that industry wanted to contract with, AccessCo became known as the 
“supplier of no choice,” delivering service “at the lowest common denominator,” or simply “bad 
service” (Discussion, AccessCo meeting). Indeed, engineers being unable to provide services to 
the customer did not solely generate ‘bad service’, but also meant that the new provisions of the 
equivalent product could not be made.  
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These escalating implications reverberated at the highest level with corporate managers unable 
to keep the agreed terms and conditions of the Mandate.  Indeed, they had to negotiate a new 
mandatory use deadline for ProductA, accompanied by a hefty fine, as they realized that the 
product they had could not yet be supplied. Something as simple as how engineers introduced 
themselves to end-users had amplifying effects throughout the organization, as other elements in 
enacting the ESS were also affected; each of which underwent their own unintended consequences 
and reinforcing actions cycles that, cumulatively, created a catastrophic service breakdown. Despite 
performing and reinforcing the ESS, Telco could not deliver the intent of the Mandate. As these 
service effects accumulated, AccessCo was depicted as a failure in the national media and attracted 
significant complaints, publicly highlighting Telco’s inability to deliver: “Have you read the papers? 
When we said we wanted everyone to know AccessCo, this isn’t what we had in mind!” It was a 
failure at all levels, with engineers, divisional managers and corporate managers all contributing to 
the breakdown. Technically, they had performed the ESS of structural separation in an 
independent way to supply equivalent service to all of industry. The service failure, however, was 
certainly not intended by the Mandate. 
The entire change process came to a halt while managers assessed what they could do to 
address these issues. The core problem was that performing the ESS was not delivering the key 
principles guiding the Mandate: “There is a tension between interpreting what’s the spirit of the 
Mandate and trying to actually do the – well, the physical tasks of it” (Corporate Change Manager, 
interview). This made the managers realize that the espoused structure must be changed and, 
potentially, the strategy also modified: “Something has to give” (Corporate manager, meeting).  
4) Reflecting Action Cycle: Modifying the ESS to reflect the intended Mandate. The 
breakdown helped show corporate managers that there was a fundamental misalignment between 
the ESS and the intended Mandate. A fully separate structure could not deliver the quality product 
and service strategy entailed in being the industry supplier. Hence, even if they were doing exactly 
as the ESS specified, they were not meeting the intent of the Mandate. This spurred reflective 
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action, making them consider what was actually intended by the Mandate – the ‘spirit’ – and what 
actions could deliver it:  
Part of what I am looking at is how people interpret the Mandate. The Mandate would just 
have said that you need to deliver this integrated service, but it wouldn’t have told you how 
in any real detail. ‘Is this your [regulator] way of putting this integrated package together 
and getting rid of some systems?’ If this is your way of interpreting and understanding, 
then how we can deliver this? Is it the intent of the Mandate or just an operational 
efficiency? Where are we going wrong and what do we need to do to get it right? (AccessCo 
Manager, Interview). 
 
Top managers took new action, such as ‘deep dives2’, working with engineers, project 
teams, and divisional managers to drill down into why problems had escalated into the breakdown. 
For example, people began to realize that the way engineers introduced themselves to end-users 
failed to link AccessCo to Telco or to industry retailers. Performing the espoused strategy of 
independent industry supply through structural separation had severed a critical link to Telco as a 
trusted supplier, leaving AccessCo on its own as a ‘new’ division that lacked a reputation with end-
users for quality products and services. Thus, engineers could not supply their services for industry 
retailers, or only deliver them with significant delay, resulting in poor service overall; “These guys 
are in the real world – you just can’t give them something that doesn’t work” (Division manager, 
meeting). This had knock-on effects for other change tasks.  
Top managers thus engaged in a series of “deeply intellectual and spiritual arguments on 
what we are required to do and what not” (Corporate meeting). They accompanied such reflections 
with new actions, such as internal deep dives on the intent of the Mandate and meetings with the 
regulator and industry to discuss potential solutions. Here they did not simply specify problems 
such as how engineers could enter end-user houses but more broadly situated this problem within 
the intended Mandate; how could AccessCo remain independent within Telco, yet also supply 
equivalent but high quality services to the industry, including RetailDivs? Through these reflective 
                                                 
2 We observed these deep dives to address specific elements of breakdowns. They were typically teleconferences on 
Fridays and Sundays between the Group and Divisional CEOs and the different people engaged in specific tasks to 
discuss and make decisions on even very micro actions, such as which customers to migrate onto a particular element 
of a new system at what specific time.  
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actions they realized that the ESS would need to shift to accommodate their growing 
understanding of the Mandate; no-one could change the Mandate, but they could adapt the strategy 
and structure to better deliver what they understood to be the spirit of that mandate. The purpose 
of independent and equivalent supply was not to produce separation at any cost. Rather, it was 
meant to ensure an equal playing field, where RetailDivs garnered no unfair competitive advantage. 
While separation was meant to be a structural tool to achieve this, it had unintentionally prevented 
delivery of other elements of the Mandate, specifically supplying industry with high quality 
products and services. “Industry and the regulator would expect Telco’s wholly-owned RetailDivs 
and its wholly-owned distributor, AccessCo to act within the spirit of the Mandate for the benefit 
of all our customers who want a competitive offer. And it’s getting that balance right” (Corporate 
manager, interview). Engaging in these reflective actions, managers began to realize that AccessCo 
and Telco would need some connection, due to their unique relationship. The question was how 
to convey that relationship in a way that most effectively addressed the Mandate.  
Across the organization, managers engaged in further reflective actions to develop 
solutions. For example, they considered asking for specific regulatory exemptions from service 
delivery, as long as the products and services were equivalent: “we’re looking at ways in which we 
can add exceptions to the Mandate that help us resolve these issues” (Division manager, meeting). 
Yet they felt that such exceptions would not be in the ‘spirit’ of the Mandate, as supplying quality 
products and services was strategically important: “We are trying to develop an acceptable story 
to present to the regulator, based around ensuring industry access to high quality products and 
services, rather than getting regulator deadlines and milestones for specific systems to be changed” 
(Corporate Manager, meeting). They thus put together a team to work out these issues with the 
regulator, discussing the technical detail of independence and how to perform this for AccessCo, 
RetailDivs, Telco, and external retailers. They also gathered ‘customer experience’ reports about 
the impact of these issues on end-users. Through such actions, they reviewed multiple potential 
solutions until they arrived at a modified ESS that seemed aligned with the spirit of the Mandate.  
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Because of their specific roles and responsibilities in signing the Mandate and ensuring its 
implementation, corporate managers specified the shift in the ESS, which now acknowledged that 
AccessCo had some connection to Telco, even as it supplied both internal and external retailers. 
Future performative actions would need to emphasize AccessCo “as part of Telco,” which was 
known to provide high-quality engineering services. In a series of high-level meetings held as part 
of their iterative reflective actions, corporate managers confirmed with the regulator and industry 
members that this new ESS was faithful to the intent behind the Mandate: “Negotiations with the 
regulator are going well. Bad service is in no one’s best interest” (Corporate manager, interview). 
5) Performing Action Cycle: Enacting the Modified ESS. With this shift in the ESS, a 
new performing action cycle was triggered. Although corporate managers initially drove the 
process with a raft of managerial actions to communicate, articulate and embed modifications in 
the ESS, it was brought into being through actions across the organization, as we now explain, 
with specific reference to the engineers’ service delivery tasks. 
Corporate managers emphasized the new structural linkages, in which connections between 
groups and divisions, such as co-location of engineering and technical workers or having specific 
linking people on projects, were permitted on specific tasks when necessary to achieve product 
and service delivery. They explained that these linkages were strategically important in 
strengthening their business proposition to supply all industry retailers with high quality products 
and services out of AccessCo: “It can only be a good thing for industry retailers if AccessCo is 
well respected; after all, they are basing their offering on AccessCo” (Corporate manager, Product 
meeting). As part of the modified ESS, explicit changes were approved to bolster the credibility of 
AccessCo engineering services and enhance their supply, including co-location of the Telco and 
AccessCo brands. These new performances by corporate managers in articulating the strategic 
proposition to strengthen the quality of industry supply through a separate but connected structure 
cascaded across all levels in a new cycle of performing the ESS.  
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Divisional managers engaged in a series of high-level cross-divisional meetings: “This is really 
about setting up the big things that will tell us how to re-engineer the process to make it work” 
(Division manager, Interview). This ultimately involved rebranding vans and uniforms, making 
both Telco and AccessCo logos clearly visible in all customer-facing spaces, and purchasing full 
page ads in newspapers to explain ‘the arrival of AccessCo, a Telco business’ and the implications 
for end-users: “When you see an AccessCo van, you’re getting Telco expertise without the Telco 
baggage” (Division manager, Interview). To complement these actions, divisional managers also 
worked with their employees to enact the modified ESS. For example, engineers were given 
scripted responses and training in how to explain the radical change to end-users. The modified 
structural linkage was communicated through a series of breakfast meetings: “We reminded them 
that we are ‘a part of but apart from’ Telco – Telco is in our DNA, but we are AccessCo now” 
(Division manager, Implementation Board meeting). Conscious of remaining within the ‘spirit’ of 
the Mandate, they also clarified that despite these modifications, AccessCo still operated at arm’s 
length from Telco, supplying an independent service to all end-users, irrespective of whether they 
purchased from RetailDivs or another industry retailer. Structural linkages were important in 
offering strategically competitive products to all retailers, although they still had to be performed 
within the guidelines of independent and equivalent industry supply.  
Engineers also performed new actions. Critically, they now introduced themselves as 
“[we’re] from AccessCo, a part of Telco Group, here on behalf of [Retailer].” This Retailer was 
the specific contracted party, which was either an external industry retailer or RetailDivs. New 
structural links from AccessCo to the familiar Telco organization were thus performed, whilst 
emphasizing that strategically, engineers were working for various industry retailers. To enable 
competition in the ‘spirit’ of the strategy, they could include any retailer, including RetailDivs. With 
these actions, Engineers could now get into houses to deliver engineering services, thereby 
achieving the intended service outcomes and reinforcing the new actions: “It’s fine. I don’t have 
any problems getting into houses now” (AccessCo engineer, shadowing). These seemingly micro 
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changes in the actions of engineers arose from important modifications to the ESS that 
constructed new structural links for performing independence so that the strategy of industry 
supplier could also be delivered to all competitors.  
Summary: Reflective Shifts in How to Enact the Mandate. These processual dynamics 
of shifting action cycles, triggered by escalating unintended consequences and breakdowns, 
occurred not only in this task, but throughout the organization (see Table 4). This enabled Telco 
to meet the intent of the Mandate: becoming independent and supplying products to all of industry 
that were equivalent and of high quality, albeit not without modifications to the ESS. These 
modifications emerged as Telco managers developed their understanding of the intent of the 
Mandate and how it could be enacted. These processual dynamics, which occurred across multiple 
tasks (see Table 4), enabled both these managers and their regulatory stakeholders to understand 
the Mandate as something that had been realized within Telco. Indeed, at the 28-month Strategic 
Review undertaken by the regulator on behalf of industry and government, Telco was confirmed 
to have met the Mandate and fulfilled its legal obligations.  
Reflective Shifts in Bringing about the Change 
Bringing about the change involved reflective shifts in understanding the intention of the 
Mandate and how to perform its elements strategically and structurally. As these shifts in the ESS 
were achieved through multiple action cycles around the organization, they were not temporally 
discrete episodes or ‘phases’, but rather emerged cumulatively from reflective action cycles over a 
series of breakdowns. We observed subtle shifts in the ESS, morphing from an ‘independent’ to a 
separate but connected ‘industry supplier’ to all retailers, internal and external. ‘Equivalence’ meant 
‘fair’ rather than equal and ‘product’ high-quality, fit-for-market products rather than merely 
available ones. While entwined and co-evolving, for the sake of simplicity, we now conclude our 
presentation of the findings by explaining the strategic and structural shifts involved in each 
element separately (see also Table 3). 
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Independence. Throughout the many change tasks, actors struggled with how to perform 
‘independence,’ which was a key principle of the Mandate. When they enacted it as espoused, 
through actions that kept AccessCo and RetailDivs strictly separate, they kept experiencing 
unintended consequences that hindered their ability to deliver separate products and services to 
industry. Over various breakdowns such as the one described above, managers engaged in 
reflective actions that increasingly broadened their scope for performing independence. Through 
these small shifts, ‘independence’ was gradually espoused as simultaneous separation and 
collaboration, enabling performing action cycles that enacted functional separation between 
AccessCo and RetailDivs on corporate and commercial issues but facilitated working together to 
support the other elements of the mandated change. For example, specific actions enabled working 
together to develop and supply quality products and services (see Tasks 2 & 3, Table 4). Thus, 
although actions initially enacted separate divisions in the name of independence, they were later 
modified to both separate and unite the divisions in order to perform a refined understanding of 
independence in line with the principles of the Mandate (e.g. see Tasks 1, 2 & 5, Table 4).  
Industry Supplier. The ‘industry supplier’ element of the Mandate was a new strategy, 
delivered structurally through the creation of AccessCo to be the supplier to industry. At first, in 
line with the independence element of the ESS, managers performed ‘industry supplier’ by 
interacting with external industry retailers at the expense of internal retailers. This had unintended 
consequences across a range of tasks, as AccessCo employees could not incorporate the expertise 
of their largest and most experienced customer, RetailDivs, in developing quality products. 
Ultimately, this also affected their ability to supply. Breakdowns in supply triggered reflective 
action on the real purpose of independence in the context of being an industry supplier. Reflecting 
that the Mandate was innately concerned with quality as well, they realized that, from a strategic 
perspective, they needed to be a ‘quality industry supplier’ (see tasks, 1,3,5 & 6, Table 4). They 
supported this shift in the espoused strategy with new structural actions within various change 
tasks, such as project teams inviting internal retailers to take part in their interaction with external 
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industry retailers. In this way, project managers and employees could access the expertise of 
RetailDivs and consider how to supply their needs as customers. Yet they could also meet the 
wider Mandate of independence and equivalence, as RetailDiv managers interacted with AccessCo 
in the same way as the rest of industry. Thus, while actions around the ‘industry supplier’ element 
initially focused solely on external retailers, they were adapted to focus on all retailers, whilst still 
maintaining a transparent and fair supply to all industry members, in line with the spirit of the 
Mandate.  
Equivalence. Initially, the ESS shaped actions aimed at standardizing information and 
products to ensure that all retailers were treated equally by AccessCo, with no advantage to 
RetailDivs. However, performing this ‘one-size-fit-all’ approach across a range of tasks had 
unintended consequences. Retailers had divergent business models and unique requirements that 
were not addressed by the standardized offering. The change process broke down on the various 
deliverables; a strategy of strictly equal offerings from AccessCo, while technically equivalent, 
could not deliver the quality products and services that industry wanted to buy. Reflective action 
broadened the way managers understood this part of the Mandate. Specifically, equivalence was 
interpreted over time to entail offering differentiated information and products to industry on a 
fair basis. All retailers were given access to the same suite of differentiated products, priced 
transparently according to different quality and service levels, and could choose the option that 
suited them best. Performing actions to generate and establish pricing for these differentiated 
products enabled engineers, project managers, and managers across Telco’s divisions to enact the 
fair supply of quality products, priced according to different industry needs. Hence, equivalence 
did not simply mean being equal, but also being fair (see tasks 3-6, Table 4). 
Products. Under the Mandate, three essential products on which the entire industry 
depended needed to be supplied as equivalent products and services, as shown in the timeline of 
deliverables (Figure 1). However, performing strict separation and independence in developing the 
products meant that the technical expertise and knowledge of RetailDivs regarding what industry 
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required could not be incorporated, resulting in poor quality products. In addition, lack of co-
working meant Telco as a whole, in its different divisions, could not meet the product deadlines. 
Hence, on each of these product deliverables there were delays in supplying products that, when 
released, were not of sufficient quality to be used by industry. The customer experience and service 
crises on each of the various products and deliverables led to multiple breakdowns in the change 
process and triggered reflective action. While the products were technically equivalent and had 
been produced independently, they did not meet industry supply requirements. Strategy for the 
products shifted increasingly to developing fully functional and fit-for-market products; all of 
industry could choose differential quality and service levels, transparently priced. This was 
facilitated by an espoused structure of co-working by relevant technical staff, enabling them to 
perform change tasks such as product design, and new approaches for project teams in conducting 
product consultations with all industry retailers (see tasks 2, 3, 5 & 6).  
As evident from our explanations, these reflective shifts in understanding how to enact the 
four key elements of the Mandate were entangled, not discrete and phased structural and strategic 
shifts. Neither did they emerge from a single breakdown on a single task. Rather, they emerged 
cumulatively within the multiple reflective actions to resolve specific breakdowns arising from 
micro actions around the organization to perform the tasks of the change. 
DISCUSSION 
This paper is theoretically grounded in a practice approach to understanding how actions 
bring about radical change, in our case with the added complexity that these actions were required 
to enact a mandated shift in strategy and structure. We draw together our findings on the 
processual dynamics of three different action cycles into a conceptual framework that highlights 
how breakdowns trigger modifications to the ESS that better reflect the intent of the mandate and, 
cumulatively across many action cycles across managerial levels, enable its realization (see Figure 
2). We theorize these cycles as different modes of action (Giddens, 1984; Seidl & Hendry, 2003; 
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Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2011) that are critical in bringing about a radical, mandated change in strategy 
and structure.  
--- Insert Figure 2 here --- 
A mandated radical change that is externally imposed and contains penalties for failure is 
particularly influential in the way it shapes peoples’ actions (Rodriguez et al, 2007; Oakes et al, 
1998; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983). Their actions aim to produce the espoused strategy and structural 
arrangements as a social order (Feldman & Orlikowski, 2011; Giddens, 1984; Jarzabkowski, 2008) 
that will be collectively understood to have ‘met’ the terms of the mandate. This is depicted in 
Figure 2, where the ESS provides particular meaning in shaping people’s actions. As shown in the 
multiple performing action cycles (Figure 2, A), its effect is powerful; people throughout the 
organization, from operational employees to top managers, endeavor to enact the specified ESS 
as it pertains to their particular change tasks. When unintended consequences arise from their 
actions, they do not simply build such consequences into their reinterpretations and modifications 
of the change initiative, as found in other studies (e.g. Balogun & Johnson 2004; 2005; Mantere et 
al, 2012). Instead, they question their actions, with operational employees and middle managers 
referring them up through the organization to check whether they are really performing the 
strategy and structure as espoused within the mandate. However, unlike other studies where people 
shift their actions in response to unintended consequences as they become aware of them (e.g. 
Bucher & Langley, 2016; Dittrich et al, 2016; Rerup & Feldman, 2011), we see the opposite effect. 
In our case, unintended consequences actually trigger reinforcing action cycles (Figure 2, B). As 
multiple levels of actors, right up to the top of the organization, question these actions and then 
confirm their fit with the ESS, actions are reinforced in the various change tasks, thereby 
exacerbating the unintended consequences. We suggest that this recursive reinforcement of action 
in relation to the social order being constructed (Bucher & Langley, 2016; Jarzabkowski, 2004) is 
explained by the legally-binding mandate. Actors are concerned with producing the mandated 
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strategy and structure, to which they have committed, and thus assume problems are a matter of 
simply working harder at achieving that commitment.  
However, as depicted in Figure 2, C, if the unintended consequences of enacting the 
strategy and structure in this way inhibit attempts to realize the mandated change, a breakdown in 
the change process occurs. Breakdowns are defined as a complete disruption to practice (Lok & 
de Rond, 2013; Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2011); in our case at each level of the organization, actors 
were unable, despite their conscious efforts, to accomplish the mandated objectives, bringing the 
change to a halt. Breakdowns trigger a shift to a new reflecting action cycle (Figure 2, D) in which 
actors, particularly top managers, who have responsibility for meeting the mandate, are no longer 
enacting the current ESS, but are reflecting instead on the intent of the mandate and how the ESS 
might be modified to meet it. We argue that breakdowns are critical triggers in a mandated change 
process precisely because they paralyze the change process, enabling top managers and other 
organizational members to question what the mandate really means (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2011). 
Reflective action permits actors to question, if not the mandate, then whether modifying actions 
will enable them to enact the mandate more effectively. Importantly, breakdowns enable co-
evolution of strategy and structure; designated actors, such as top managers, consider 
modifications in the ESS to counteract the breakdowns and better reflect their evolving 
understanding of the underlying intent of the mandate. Indeed, these breakdowns seem key to 
enabling actors to step back from their everyday practice (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2011; Seidl & 
Hendry, 2003) and engage in deliberate reinterpretation and modification of the ESS.  
As Figure 2 shows, the process may be repetitive (Figure 2E), as new performing action 
cycles enact the evolved ESS, from which further unintended consequences may arise and 
escalate, leading to further breakdowns. As the modifications that arise from subsequent 
reflecting action cycles trigger multiple new performing action cycles, they cascade throughout 
the organization from the way top managers articulate the espoused change to the actions 
performed by middle and operational managers in performing their various tasks. Such actions 
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might be micro-adjustments at an operational level to specific ways, for example, of entering a 
consumer’s house, which subtly modify how the ESS is enacted in each part of the organization. 
Cumulatively, they effect a bigger shift in understanding the intent of the mandate and how to 
perform it. Although such small changes in performing, occurring in different parts of the 
organization, in different tasks, and at different times are not strictly linear or phased, taken 
together they evolve an overarching understanding of how to enact new strategic and structural 
arrangements that collectively produce the mandate as a social reality (Feldman & Orlikowski, 
2011; Giddens, 1984). Actors who have been through such multiple performing, reinforcing and 
reflecting cycles on different tasks at operational, middle and senior levels, in our case including 
external negotiations with those who regulate the mandated change, produce unfolding change 
in strategy and structure. Yet, it is important to note that in our case the legally-binding mandate, 
did not alter. Rather, multiple iterative action cycles enabled important interpretive 
understandings to emerge across managerial levels, and be captured in an evolving ESS, about 
what actions were in the ‘spirit’ of the Mandate. In doing so, they also collectively produce the 
meaning of the change process as realizing the mandate. 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
Our framework makes four contributions. First, we extend understanding of how 
breakdowns shape the processual dynamics of radical change. In the context of mandated radical 
change, breakdowns trigger a switch to a reflective mode in which actors can consider adapting 
their actions to their evolving understanding of the intent behind the mandate. Second, in 
examining actions across the organization, we extend understanding of how people’s actions 
produce radical change in the context of unintended consequences and breakdowns. Third, we 
build on existing studies of managerial strategizing roles (e.g. Floyd & Lane, 2000; Rouleau & 
Balogun, 2011) to show that top managers are active participants in iteratively working out how 
to perform the change. Finally, we go beyond existing studies that examine how people enact 
strategic change (e.g. Balogun & Johnson, 2004; Balogun et al, 2015a; 2015b; Wiedner et al, 2017) 
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by giving equal emphasis to strategic and structural change and how they co-evolve within people’s 
actions (Floyd et al, 2011; Pye & Pettigrew, 2006).  
Breakdowns and the processual dynamics of radical change. There is an ongoing tension between 
recursive practice, in which action and social order are mutually reinforcing and persistent, and 
adaptive practice, in which actions progressively reconstruct social order in an ongoing state of 
flux (Bucher & Langley, 2016; Howard-Grenville, 2005; Jarzabkowski, 2004; Orlikowski, 2000; 
Tsoukas & Chia, 2002). A few practice-based studies have theorized blockages as important 
triggers of the switch from recursive to adaptive dynamics (e.g. Bucher & Langley, 2016; Hendry 
& Seidl, 2003; Rerup & Feldman, 2011). As people struggle to construct a new social order 
(Jarzabkowski et al, 2012), blockages enable them to step outside of existing practice (Hendry & 
Seidl, 2003; Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2011) in order to reflect on alternative ways of acting (Bucher 
& Langley, 2016; Dittrich et al, 2016; Rerup & Feldman, 2011). Our case of breakdown during 
mandated change is a valuable extreme example that extends understanding of how blockages 
shape the dynamics of change. Specifically, others find that ‘micro-signals’ in blockages prompt 
actors to experiment with adaptations that iteratively shape how change is reinterpreted and 
realized (e.g. Bucher & Langley, 2016; Dittrich et al, 2016; Rerup & Feldman, 2011). By contrast, 
in our study, when actors experienced problems in enacting the ESS, these micro-signals prompted 
them to reinforce their actions. Only complete breakdowns (Lok & de Rond, 2013) in the change 
process led them to reflect upon alternatives. While most studies are thus based on an iterative 
process of reconstructing social order (e.g. Bucher & Langley, 2016; Feldman & Pentland, 2003; 
Rerup & Feldman, 2011; Spee & Jarzabkowski, 2011), in our case, multiple iterations surfaced, 
further articulated and reinforced the envisioned social order.  
We thus extend existing knowledge about the iterative nature of change to encompass 
cumulative cycles of action when change is constrained by a mandate. A mandated change 
constrains organizational actors from making the iterative micro-adjustments that progressively 
enact the shifting social order found in other studies (e.g. Balogun & Johnson, 2004; 2005; Bucher 
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& Langley, 2016; Orlikowski, 2000; Rerup & Feldman, 2011; Spee & Jarzabkowski, 2011). Instead, 
multiple iterative cycles of blockages accumulate until they bring everyday practice to a breakdown 
in which people are too paralyzed to act (Lok & de Rond, 2013; Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2011). We 
argue that such cumulative cycles, witnessed in the escalation of unintended consequences in our 
conceptual model, are necessary for a shift in action during a particularly constrained vision of 
change. Only when they cannot enact the mandate because the change process breaks down, do 
actors switch to a reflective detachment in which they are able to consider what social order the 
mandate is intended to realize (see Dittrich et al, 2016; Giddens, 1979: 24; 1984: 8; Hendry & Seidl, 
2003; Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2011). Our conceptual framework thus furthers understanding of the 
iterative nature of adaptive action, by showing that cumulative reinforcement of action that 
escalates into breakdown is important in generating adaptive action in the context of change 
constrained by a mandate.  
Unintended consequences and cumulative cycles of action in the delivery of radical change. The association 
between cumulative cycles and unintended consequences in Figure 2 extends our understanding 
of how people’s actions produce radical change. The more macro process studies that find 
frequent oscillations and failures to change between one strategy-structure configuration and 
another (e.g. Amburgey & Dacin, 1994; Amis et al, 2004; Greenwood & Hinings, 1993), and those 
studies that examine how people’s actions modify (e.g. Balogun & Johnson, 2004; 2005; Mantere 
et al, 2012; Rerup & Feldman, 2011; Sonenshein, 2010), deviate from (e.g. Maitlis & Lawrence, 
2003; Mantere et al, 2012; Wiedner et al, 2017), and workaround (Bertels et al, 2016; Pollock, 2005), 
planned change processes (see Bartunek et al, 2011), all show that unintended consequences 
comprise part of the realized change.  Indeed, many such studies explore the performing cycles in 
radical change, seeking to understand how and why particular outcomes are realized. Drawing on 
various theoretical lenses such as discursive (e.g. Balogun et al, 2011; Mantere & Vaara, 2008; 
Mirabeau & Maguire, 2014), interpretive / sensemaking (e.g. Balogun & Johnson 2004 & 2005; 
Balogun et al, 2015a, b; Mantere et al 2012; Rerup & Feldman, 2011), or managerial roles (e.g. 
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Floyd & Lane, 2000; Mantere, 2008; Rouleau & Balogun, 2011), they explain how people perform 
the unintended consequences that become integral to the change that is realized. Our extended 
study of radical change and our focus on action, reveals the significance of not only performing 
cycles but also, reinforcing and reflecting cycles in realizing a change as intended against its higher-
level objectives.  
In our context of a mandated change, unintended consequences do not waylay change, but 
serve as a means to clarify its intent and, as they escalate to breakdown, to reconfigure action to 
better realize that intent, in the process further interpreting what that intent might be. Thus, the 
processual dynamics of bringing about a mandated change provide important insights into how 
action can be continuously reconfigured towards an evolving understanding of intent. Unintended 
consequences occur and are inevitable. The studies cited above, offer many explanations for why. 
What they have not shown us is how organizations move forward from unintended consequences 
to deliver intended change. Figure 2 provides such an explanation. Through Figure 2, we suggest 
that continuous action cycles, both throughout the organization and in interaction with important 
external parties such as the regulator, are a subtle means of reinterpreting the intent, in order to 
produce a collective understanding that the changed social order conforms to the mandate 
(Giddens, 1984). 
Expanding the role of top managers. While other studies emphasize the active work of change 
recipients, typically middle managers, in making sense of and giving sense to an espoused change 
in ways that reinterpret and modify it (Balogun et al, 2004; Mantere, 2008; Rerup & Feldman, 2011; 
Rouleau, 2005; Rouleau & Balogun, 2011), our findings show the importance of top managers, 
typically considered change designers (e.g. Balogun et al, 2015a; Burgelman, 1983; Floyd & Lane, 
2000; Jarzabkowski, 2008) in this process. Our findings show the active role of top managers in 
the reinforcing cycles through which actions escalate up and cascade down an organization and 
how their shift to reflecting cycles are critical in modifying change. We thus extend understanding 
beyond the typical cognitive reorientation of middle and operational change recipients (e.g. 
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Balogun et al, 2011; 2015b; Gioia & Chittipedi, 1999), to also incorporate the actions of top 
managers who are not only change givers, but are also actively involved in working out how to 
perform the change and, through reflective action, how to reinterpret and modify those 
performances. Our focus on action provides granular insights that extend understanding of the 
strategy work of top managers in radical change, showing this work to extend beyond design and 
acting as “ghosts” in the sensemaking processes of others (Balogun & Johnson 2004: 524). We 
incorporate active top manager engagement throughout the organization to identify and remedy 
problems via particular sets of actions that form reinforcing and reflecting cycles. In doing so, we 
expand on role-based theories of how top managers perform their responsibilities in articulating 
and directing strategy (e.g. Floyd & Lane, 2000; Mintzberg, 1983), and setting the strategic and 
structural context (Burgelman, 1983). We show the processual dynamics through which actions 
escalate up and cascade down the organization as managers at different levels connect in 
addressing the unintended consequences and breakdowns emerging from their various actions. 
Coevolution of strategy and structure. Our study also contributes to understanding of how 
strategy and structure move together during periods of radical change when both are disrupted 
(Mintzberg, 1990; Tushman & Romanelli, 1985). In many existing studies, the radical redesign of 
structure is simply a “one-off” reconfiguration of structural roles that aim to deliver a dramatic 
shift in strategy (Gulati & Puranam, 2009; McKinkey & Scherer, 2000; Romanelli & Tushman, 
1994), albeit a redesign that is often problematic and causes delay in or failure to change (e.g. Amis 
et al, 2004; Amburgey & Dacin, 1994; Gulati & Puranam, 2009). Even those studies that examine 
how people enact strategic change from their different structural positions in the organization (e.g. 
Balogun et al, 2015a; 2015b; Mantere & Vaara, 2008; Wiedner et al, 2017) tend to background how 
enacting structure is integral to and entwined with enacting strategy (Floyd et al, 2011; Pye & 
Pettigrew, 2006), and how the two, therefore, co-evolve in bringing about radical change. By 
contrast, we show how actions simultaneously enact and so co-evolve strategy and structure. Our 
extreme case of shifting strategy and structure shows that the two are entangled in a mutually 
 39
constitutive social ordering of organizational arrangements (Feldman & Orlikowski, 2011; Pye & 
Pettgirew, 2006). We thus provide a more dynamic and reciprocal understanding of the 
relationship between strategy and structure and their co-evolution during radical change. 
CONCLUSION 
Our framework, based on a study of a telecommunications company undergoing a 
mandated radical change imposed by the regulator that had to be realized largely in line with intent, 
or face major penalties, suggests some boundary conditions. While in studies of failed (e.g. Amis 
et al, 2004; Greenwood & Hinings, 1988) or aborted (e.g. Mantere et al, 2012) radical change, there 
may be more managerial discretion to change or abandon the initial strategy, this was not an option 
for our company. Hence, our finding of the shifts in action triggered by breakdowns may be 
grounded in the need for managers to find a way to make the change work, whereas other 
situations permit managers to resist, reverse or modify the envisioned change. The constraint of a 
mandate is thus key to the processual dynamics explained in our conceptual framework.  
In particular, the mandate in our case was externally imposed by a powerful government 
actor, was very detailed and specific, and was legally-binding. Many companies face some form of 
mandated change, such as regulatory pressure on their strategy and structure (Jacobides, 2005), 
from banks that must separate their investment and retail divisions (e.g. Danthine et al, 1999; 
Heffernan, 2005) to the majority of utility and critical infrastructure companies with legacy 
monopolistic assets that are subject to regulation, such as those in energy and transport (e.g. York, 
Hargrave & Pacheco, 2016). Similarly, many public-sector companies, such as those within the 
health care sector (e.g. Denis et al, 2001; Wiedner et al, 2017) or the arts (e.g. Oakes et al, 1998; 
Abdallah & Langley, 2014), often face radical changes arising from new government policies. Such 
externally imposed changes may be less detailed or less binding than in our case. Future research 
might examine whether such mandates that are either less detailed or less binding, are equally 
prone to reinforcing action cycles and breakdown, or whether actors more flexibly interpret the 
unintended consequences or even alter the mandate. 
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Mandated change might also stem from internal pressures, such as a particularly powerful 
actor’s vision of a change, or the pressures of a corporate parent upon a division. While managers 
in such situations might feel constrained to comply with the change, the dynamics may differ 
because the mandate itself is less specific, less detailed and does not carry legal consequences or 
external penalties for failure to comply. In particular, in our study, top managers were part of the 
legal negotiation of the mandate, and required to ensure it was met, so recasting their role as change 
recipients (Balogun et al, 2015a). A particularly valuable dynamic arising from this role was their 
engagement in reflecting action cycles, within which they could consider the intent behind the 
change, and modify their actions to better meet that intent. Such reflecting action cycles provide 
opportunities for managers at all levels, particularly top managers who can become remote from 
change initiatives and their implementation (Balogun and Johnson, 2004; Floyd & Lane, 2000), to 
renew their engagement with the change. This ongoing and renewed engagement might be valuable 
in delivering on many change processes (Bartunek et al, 2011), even in the absence of a mandate. 
Thus future studies might examine the implications of different types of mandates, whether 
externally or internally imposed, the extent to which these mandates are binding, what levels of 
manager are assigned responsibility for fulfilling the mandate, and how and whether the perception 
of constraint shapes managerial engagement with the change. 
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TABLES & FIGURES 
Table 1. Data sources 
Data Category Description Number 
Meeting (N=254) Group Implementation Board 
Weekly meetings, generally 1 hour long 
72  
AccessCo Implementation Board 
Fortnightly meetings, generally 1 hour long 
34 
Wholesale Implementation Board 
Monthly meetings, generally 1 hour long 
14 
Retail Implementation Board 
Fortnightly meetings, generally 1 hour long 
26 
International Retail Implementation Board 
2-3 times per month, generally 2 hours long 
59 
Additional meetings across divisions, incl. 
product meetings and briefings, varied length 
49 
Interviews (N=130) Senior managers 
Managers at the highest level of the organization with 
day-to-day responsibilities of managing the organization 
(including CEOs, Managing Directors, General 
Managers, Heads of Division) 
53 
Middle managers 
Managers at the intermediate level of the organization 
with responsibility for at least two lower levels of staff 
77 
Field observations (N=16)  Telephony engineers 
Work shadowing and interviews with frontline workers 
about the restructuring and its impact 
9 
Service center employees 
Work shadowing and interviews with frontline call center 
employees about the restructuring and its impact 
7 
Documents (N=1,597) Company reports 
Internal reports, largely offering delivery updates 
589 
Internal communications 
E-mails, notifications, pamphlets, flyers 
54 
Organizational meeting notes & presentations 
Meeting minutes and associated presentations 
489 
Press releases 
Updates about restructuring and product releases 
91 
Other docs (internal) 
Posters, pictures, internal notes, product spec 
274 
Industry reports 
Reports by regulator, government, competitors 
68 
Newspaper articles 
Reporting of restructuring and product releases 
32 
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Table 2. Analytic constructs used in processual analysis and findings 
Construct Definition Example 
Mandate The framework or guideline for change, 
imposed by a powerful external actor, with 
which they must comply or face sanctions 
(Rodriguez et al, 2007). 
 
 
Legally-binding policy called ‘the Mandate’, 
approved by government, overseen by 
regulator, and signed by Telco top managers. 
The document outlined key deliverables, which 
included specific strategic objectives and 
structural elements that had to be delivered by 
set deadlines. Failure to meet deadlines entailed 
financial penalties and carried the risk of referral 
to the Competition Commission for breakup.  
Espoused 
Strategy  
The internalized strategic objectives of an 
organization as a whole (Kaplan & Norton, 
1996, 2007), which include sources of 
profitability, profit level, and rates of return, 
and span across multiple SBUs. Based on 
understanding of the Mandate and what is 
required in terms of strategy. 
To be an independent supplier of equivalent 
industry products  
(See Findings & Table 3) 
Espoused 
Structure 
The internalized grouping and linking 
mechanisms (see Gulati & Puranam, 2009; 
Thompson 1967). Grouping. Structural 
arrangement that groups roles together in 
order to optimize coordination by creating 
structured interactions between relevant 
organizational members. Linking. Structural 
arrangement that determines how different 
groups link vertically & horizontally across the 
organizational. Based on understanding of 
structural requirements of the Mandate  
 
 
Grouping example: strategic business units 
necessarily include separate grouping of 
different staff into AccessCo and RetailDivs 
 
Linking example: develop a cross-divisional 
working group for ProductC 
(See Findings) 
Performing 
Action Cycle 
Performing actions to enact the existing 
understanding of the espoused strategy and 
structure (ESS) 
Doing tasks based on existing understanding of 
ESS: e.g. setting up working groups, changing 
reporting structures, disseminating strategic 
goals, undergoing training (see Table 4) 
Unintended 
consequence 
Unexpected outcome that deviates from 
intended strategic change (see Balogun & 
Johnson, 2005) 
Inability to enter houses to provide services (see 
Findings) 
Reinforcing 
Action Cycle 
Intensifying existing ways of enacting ESS in 
effort to address unintended consequences; 
confirming objectives and structures as 
appropriate. 
Doing things that confirm the existing 
understanding of ESS, e.g. checking with peers, 
referring upwards, cascading down in ways that 
involved checking, confirming, validating, 
repeating existing actions 
Breakdown Failure that disrupts the strategic change 
process (see Lok & de Rond, 2013)  
Inability to progress product deliveries leading 
to failed deadlines and fines (see Table 4) 
Reflecting 
Action Cycle 
Engage in actions that reflect on the underlying 
intent of the Mandate, and that revisit and 
modify understanding of strategy and structure 
in ways that conform to the legal requirements 
and also reflect the intent (‘spirit’) of the 
Mandate 
Doing things that question the existing way of 
acting and whether these actions are in the 
‘spirit’ of the mandate, including organizing 
deep dives throughout the organization with 
managers and employees at all levels, consulting 
with regulator & industry 
Realized 
Radical 
Change 
Change that has been brought about at 
identified point in time, which may incorporate 
both intended and emergent change (Mintzberg 
& Waters 1985) 
At Strategic Review in month 28, conducted by 
regulator on behalf of government & industry, 
Telco approved as meeting Mandated change, 
despite modifications of ESS throughout 
change process, as understanding of how to 
meet intent of Mandate evolves 
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Table 3: Reflective Shifts in how to “do” the Mandate 
Overarching 
Mandate 
Elements of the 
Mandate  
How to Enact the Mandate Modifying Enactment of the 
Mandate 
Create 
independent 
industry 
supplier of 
equivalent 
products  
 
Independent AccessCo 
offers no undue 
competitive 
advantage to Telco 
RetailDivs, who can 
thus compete 
independently in 
retail space. 
‘Doing independent’ refers to 
separation; i.e. keeping strict 
separation between AccessCo and 
RetailDivs (‘separate’). 
 
‘Doing independent’ refers to 
separation and collaboration; i.e. 
keeping functional separation 
between AccessCo and RetailDivs 
but working together when 
necessary to support strategic goals 
of Mandate, such as developing 
separate but quality products 
AccessCo to be 
direct industry supplier 
with no chain of 
supply to wider 
retail industry via 
Retail Divs or 
through any 
collaboration with 
Retail Divs 
‘Doing industry supplier’ entails 
interaction with external industry 
players about supply chain needed, 
i.e. interacting with external industry 
retailers while ignoring internal 
retailers  
‘Doing industry supplier’ entails 
interaction with external industry 
players and Retail Divs, i.e. 
interacting with external industry 
and internal retailers (‘all retailers’) 
in the same way in industry forums 
at through all industry consultations. 
 
 AccessCo supplying 
equivalent (identical) 
produces & services 
to ensure no unfair 
competitive 
advantage to 
RetailDivs 
‘Doing equivalent’ means 
standardizing information, products 
and services; i.e. all retailers have 
access to the same products 
(‘equal’). 
‘Doing equivalent’ means making 
standardized but differentiated 
information and products with 
matching price differentiation; i.e. all 
retailers have access to the same 
suite of products and can choose 
the option that best suits them at a 
transparent price (‘fair’).  
Separate and supply 
3 main industry 
products out of 
AccessCo by 
specific deadlines  
‘Doing products’ refers to making 
separate and equivalent products 
and services ‘available’  
‘Doing products’ refers to making 
high quality products and services 
available (‘fit-for-market’). 
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Table 4. Illustrative case stories 
Case Story Espoused Strategy and 
Structure 
Performing 
Action Cycle 
Reinforcing 
Action Cycle 
Breakdown  Reflecting 
Action Cycle 
Evolving Espoused Strategy 
and Structure 
Performing 
Action Cycle 
Realized Radical 
Change 
#1 Door-in-
the-Face: 
Independent 
engineers 
 
Original ESS: AccessCo 
engineers were a structural 
group created to deliver the 
strategy of ‘industry supplier,’ 
offering ‘equivalent’ services 
‘independently,’ and where 
 
- ‘independent’ was 
understood as AccessCo 
being ‘separate’ from 
RetailDivs 
- ‘industry supplier’ related 
only to external industry  
- ‘equivalence’ was equal 
treatment of RetailDivs and 
external industry 
- ‘product’ meant making 
available new products 
 
Illustration Original ESS 
“There’s a behavioral change 
right on the front-end 
engineer, who has to realize 
when he opens that door, he’s 
working for [an independent] 
AccessCo. And we’re very 
clear on the wording… we 
move away from the Telco 
brand and just be AccessCo” 
[independent as separate]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Effort to enact 
ESS: Become an 
independent 
industry supplier 
by keeping strict 
separation from 
RetailDivs, 
including 
engineers 
introducing 
themselves as 
‘from AccessCo.’ 
 
Unintended 
consequences: 
Engineers can’t get 
into homes to 
provide services; 
undermines the 
‘industry supplier’ 
objective because 
the ‘from 
AccessCo’ greeting 
severs a key link to 
Telco as a trusted 
supplier.   
Effort to 
reinforce 
practice: Reiterate 
objectives of 
‘independence,’ 
‘industry supplier,’ 
and ‘equivalence’. 
Reiterate the 
importance  
of independent 
engineers. 
Reinforce 
AccessCo 
boundaries, redo 
Code of Conduct 
training. 
Unintended 
consequences 
escalate until 
change halts: 
Engineer 
service not 
provided or 
delayed; Knock 
on effects as 
other tasks in 
other parts of 
organization 
cannot be 
done, including 
specific 
products trials 
and interim 
deadlines; 
AccessCo 
deemed failure 
in national 
media; High 
level 
complaints 
from industry. 
 
Effort to reflect 
on Mandate: 
Consider spirit 
of Mandate; 
consult with key 
stakeholders; do 
deep dives 
throughout 
organization; 
reconsider 
definitions and 
objectives; bring 
options to 
regulator; have 
meetings with 
other industry 
players to bring 
them on board.  
 
 
Shift in ESS: AccessCo 
engineers were a structural 
group created to deliver the 
strategy of ‘industry supplier,’ 
offering ‘equivalent’ services 
‘independently,’ where 
 
- ‘independent’ was understood 
to mean ‘separate but 
connected’ 
- ‘industry supplier’ related to 
all retailers, internal and 
external 
- ‘equivalence’ was not equal, 
but fair 
- ‘product’ or service meant not 
just available but also fit-for-
market, i.e. high quality 
 
Illustration Evolving ESS 
“Yeah, there was an error, a 
mistake. But it was an open 
mistake and we discussed it as 
an open mistake with the 
regulator and there’s a plan to 
reissue. Now you’ve got the 
‘part of Telco’ [add-on] and 
that’s important… otherwise 
customers won’t let us through 
the front door and that could 
be a real issue” [independent as 
separate but connected]. 
 
Effort to enact 
evolved ESS 
through 
reconfigured 
practices: Co-
locate AccessCo 
and Telco 
brands; hold 
meetings with 
engineers; send 
info about 
AccessCo to 
end-users; do 
training on new 
Code of 
Conduct. 
Includes new 
intro that links 
key structural 
parties 
(AccessCo & 
Telco) and key 
strategic output 
(independent 
industry supply 
(any retailer): 
“AccessCo, a 
part of Telco 
Group, here on 
behalf of 
[Retailer].”  
AccessCo 
becomes an 
independent 
industry supplier 
providing various 
equivalent 
engineering 
products and 
services to 
industry using re-
branded AccessCo 
engineers; rocky 
start results in 
failure of service 
commitments and 
penalty payments 
to external parties. 
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Case Story Espoused Strategy and 
Structure 
Performing 
Action Cycle 
Reinforcing 
Action Cycle 
Breakdown  Reflecting 
Action Cycle 
Evolving Espoused Strategy 
and Structure 
Performing 
Action Cycle 
Realized Radical 
Change 
#2 Unequal 
among 
Equals: 
Special Status 
Employees  
 
 
 
Original ESS: 
Special status was a 
structural designation 
associated with a very small 
number of employees to 
exceptionally allow them to 
access information not 
available to other employees, 
so that AccessCo and 
RetailDivs could stay 
‘independent’ while 
developing ‘equivalent’ 
‘products’ (strategy). 
 
- ‘equivalent’ meant fair 
products as a result of no 
influence from RetailDivs in 
the design process; equal 
engagement for all players 
- ‘product’ meant making 
available new products 
- ‘independent’ meant 
separation; AccessCo not 
working or sharing 
information with RetailDivs  
 
Illustration Original ESS 
“It doesn’t matter if people 
have status or not. If they 
don’t need to know a piece of 
information regarding the 
change, then don’t tell them. I 
don’t care who they are or 
how many statuses they have; 
they don’t get access to it.” 
[Independent: not sharing 
information] 
Effort to enact 
ESS: Work in 
project trams 
across 
organization done 
largely 
independently to 
make new 
equivalent 
products available; 
and offer no 
advantage to 
RetailDivs; special 
status seen as 
exceptional 
situations only; in 
the ‘spirit’ to avoid 
sharing 
information, 
except where 
proven totally 
necessary. 
 
Unintended 
consequences: 
Not sharing info 
across the 
AccessCo-
RetailDivs divide 
makes it difficult 
to advance joint 
equivalent 
products. Fall 
behind in product 
deliveries. 
  
Effort to 
reinforce 
practice: Reiterate 
the key strategic 
objective of 
‘equivalent’ 
‘products’ in 
meetings and 
communiques; 
affirm that Special 
Status can be used 
to work across 
divisions; but also 
emphasize the 
importance of 
independence and 
the risk associated 
with not acting 
separately. Get 
people to redo 
Code of Conduct 
and status training, 
so they understand 
the importance of 
‘independence’ 
and being separate. 
Leaders place 
emphasis on being 
conservative and 
acting with 
caution, “when in 
doubt, don’t do 
it!” 
 
 
Unintended 
consequences 
escalate: 
There was no 
equivalent 
product 
available that 
worked for the 
market by the 
deadline. Telco 
conceded 
failure on one 
core product 
(ProductA). 
This resulted in 
a large fine and 
a loss of 
credibility with 
the regulator 
and industry. 
 
 
Effort to reflect 
on Mandate: 
Consider spirit 
of Mandate; 
senior manager 
meetings and 
deep dives on 
interworking 
problem; 
working group 
on info-sharing 
in the context of 
independence; 
reconsider how 
to communicate 
objectives and 
Special Status.  
 
 
 
Shift in ESS: Special status was 
a structural designation that 
allowed people to access 
information not available to 
other employees, so that 
AccessCo and RetailDivs could 
stay ‘independent’ while 
developing ‘equivalent’ 
‘products’ (strategy). 
 
- ‘equivalent’ meant fair 
products as a result of no 
undue influence from 
RetailDivs in the design 
process; but people can 
engage unequally as long as it 
is fair, according no advantage  
- ‘product’ meant not just 
available but also working, i.e. 
could be used by all players 
- ‘independent’ meant 
AccessCo working together 
and sharing info with 
RetailDivs to build 
independence. 
 
Illustration Evolving ESS 
“We’re clarifying this because 
sometimes workshops have had 
to be cancelled because people 
won’t share information… 
That is not the purpose of the 
mandate. There is a lot of 
information we can share” 
[Independent as sharing 
information for the purpose of 
fostering independence]  
Effort to enact 
evolved ESS 
through 
reconfigured 
practices: 
Clarify ways to 
engage and 
explicitly tell 
people that they 
can engage 
unequally as long 
as it is fair and 
accords no 
advantage to 
RetailDivs; 
restructure 
special status list; 
develop new 
Code of 
Conduct and 
status training to 
reflect this 
understanding; 
and develop 
explicit info-
sharing rules 
(who can say 
what to whom 
and when!), 
engaging with 
others. 
 
Telco delivers 
working 
equivalent 
products using 
refined special 
status, but does so 
late and with 
penalties. 
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Case Story Espoused Strategy and 
Structure 
Performing 
Action Cycle 
Reinforcing 
Action Cycle 
Breakdown  Reflecting 
Action Cycle 
Evolving Espoused Strategy 
and Structure 
Performing 
Action Cycle 
Realized Radical 
Change 
#3 Breaking 
bad: Risking 
commercial 
contracts  
Original ESS: Repair 
services were an operational 
task that needed to be 
provided from AccessCo 
(structure) to RetailDivs and 
external retailers to enable the 
delivery of ‘equivalent’ 
‘products and services’ in its 
role as ‘industry supplier’ 
(strategy). 
 
- ‘equivalent’ meant the same 
products/ services for 
everyone 
- ‘product’ meant making new 
products available 
- ‘industry supplier’ meant 
products were available to 
all industry players 
 
Illustration Original ESS 
“They’ve determined that 
what they’re going to deliver 
is the standard terms and 
conditions, so everybody gets 
exactly the same… and 
because their performance is 
poor that means we can’t 
meet our contractual 
obligations to customers” 
[Equivalence as everyone 
receiving the same service]. 
 
 
Effort to enact 
ESS: Deliver 
equivalent 
products and 
services to all 
industry through a 
‘standardized’ 
repair time 
available to all 
retailers (default 
‘5-hour’ repair)  
 
Unintended 
consequences: 
Default practice of 
offering ‘5-hour’ 
repair time from 
AccessCo 
(structure) is not 
matched with need 
for faster repair 
times on 
existing 
commercial 
contracts. 
Obscures supplier 
objective (strategy) 
by preventing 
retailers, including 
Retail Divs, from 
meeting existing 
commitments  
Effort to 
reinforce 
practice: Reiterate 
objective of 
delivering 
equivalent 
products and 
services; reiterate 
importance of 
standard repair 
times to avoid 
giving advantage 
to Retail Divs, 
who have some of 
the commercial 
contracts; 
encourage 
AccessCo to 
continue 
developing 
standard options 
independently and 
without input 
from RetailDivs. 
 
 
Unintended 
consequences 
escalate: 
Retailers 
breach 
commercial 
contracts, due 
to the standard 
five-hour 
repair time. 
Unable to 
uphold past 
service levels, 
retailers, esp. 
premium 
retailers like 
RetailDivs, the 
breach in 
existing 
contracts, 
triggers 
mandatory 
end-user 
payments; 
customer 
dissatisfaction; 
service from 
not only 
AccessCo but 
also RetailDivs 
seen as ‘lowest 
common 
denominator.’ 
Effort to reflect 
on Mandate: 
Consider how 
these issues link 
to overall 
Mandate; while 
standard repair 
time is 
equivalent, what 
service level is 
intended in the 
Mandate; is 
differentiated 
service for some 
retailers in the 
‘spirit’ of the 
Mandate, even if 
that might 
include 
RetailDivs also 
getting the 
differentiation; 
senior managers 
work on repair 
time options 
with industry 
and with project 
teams, 
considering how 
they link to other 
deliverables.  
 
 
 
Shift in ESS: Timely repair 
services could be delivered 
from AccessCo (structure) in 
differentiated ways with 
different prices (strategy) to  
meet needs of RetailDivs and 
external retailers to service their 
customers  
 
- ‘equivalent’ meant access to the 
same products / services for 
everyone; this includes 
standard and premium repair 
options 
- ‘product’ meant making 
available new products at the 
same or higher quality  
- ‘industry supplier’ meant 
products were available to all 
industry, including RetailDivs 
and they had to work with 
retailers 
 
Illustration Evolving ESS 
“With repair, there’s now two 
service offerings. One of them 
is called ‘regular care,’ where 
the fault is fixed within 5 hours 
and one is called ‘premium 
care,’ where the fault is fixed 
within one hour… Everyone 
can choose their option. We’ll 
be using ‘premium’ because 
that’s what our customers are 
used to” [Equivalence as 
everyone having same service 
options]. 
Effort to enact 
evolved ESS 
through 
reconfigured 
practices: 
Disseminate 
clarified 
objective (i.e. to 
deliver high 
quality standard 
and premium 
equivalent 
service) to all. 
Improve 
standard repair 
options by 
including work 
on AccessCo 
and retail sides in 
the 5-hours, thus 
reducing 
AccessCo repair 
time by 2.5hrs. 
Also introduced 
new options, 
including a 1-
hour premium 
repair time. 
Allowing 
RetailDivs and 
other retailers to 
choose premium 
at a price. 
AccessCo delivers 
equivalent 
services, providing 
various standard 
and premium 
repair options, 
albeit initially with 
delays and 
complaints prior 
to redesign 
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Case Story Espoused Strategy and 
Structure 
Performing 
Action Cycle 
Reinforcing 
Action Cycle 
Breakdown  Reflecting 
Action Cycle 
Evolving Espoused Strategy 
and Structure 
Performing 
Action Cycle 
Realized Radical 
Change 
#4 RAT in 
the 
building: 
The 
Restructure 
Assurance 
Team (RAT) 
Original ESS: The RAT 
Team was an internal group 
(structure) put in place to 
monitor Telco’s efforts to 
comply with the strategic 
objectives of ‘equivalence.’ 
 
- ‘equivalence’ meant 
‘demonstrable equal 
treatment’ of RetailDivs and 
external industry by both 
performing equivalence and 
also providing information 
to RAT as evidence (share 
all info on actions for RAT 
to monitor) 
 
Illustration Original ESS 
“We’re updating them [RAT] 
weekly on progress… they 
rely on our reports to do the 
validation, so we share with 
them openly, so that we can 
all get on with our jobs”  
[Equivalence as demonstrable 
achievement via sharing all 
information and having it 
monitored by RAT] 
 
 
 
Effort to enact 
ESS: Share as 
much information 
as possible with 
RAT, so they have 
sufficient details to 
see that 
equivalence is 
being met; 
frequent reporting; 
meeting RAT 
members. 
 
Unintended 
consequences: 
RAT’s growing 
remit and 
demands placing 
increasing 
requirements on 
implementation 
board members to 
collate and share 
information; 
demonstrating 
equivalence 
becomes key 
focus, even at the 
cost of ignoring 
deliveries; makes it 
difficult for people 
to also advance 
product deliveries; 
fall behind in 
deliveries. 
 
 
Effort to 
reinforce 
practice: Reiterate 
the importance of 
transparency and 
evidencing; affirm 
purpose of RAT as 
monitors of 
equivalence; 
present RAT as 
key stakeholder; 
invite to various 
meetings; senior 
managers explain 
legitimacy; assign 
RAT-liaison; 
establish regular 
meetings; and 
encourage people 
to share info with 
them.   
Unintended 
consequences 
escalate: 
Despite the 
regulator being 
happy and 
prepared to 
sign off on a 
delivery, RAT 
uses info 
provided by 
Telco to 
declare it non-
equivalent in a 
low volume 
area of little 
significance. 
Results in 
external 
retailers 
complaining; 
regulator 
forced to 
scrutinize and 
penalize Telco; 
large financial 
penalty; 
reduced 
industry 
credibility. 
 
Effort to reflect 
on Mandate: 
Consider the 
Mandate and 
why they have 
been going 
beyond what is 
prescribed in 
effort to inform 
RAT – have 
thought it was in 
the ‘spirit’ to 
exceed 
requirement; 
Consider intent 
of Mandate to 
have monitoring, 
but not to make 
Telco vulnerable 
to excess 
reporting on 
finest details; 
Discuss with 
regulator; senior 
manager 
meetings about 
RAT with 
implementation 
board, generates 
ways to structure 
future 
engagement.  
 
Shift in ESS: RAT Team was 
an internal structural group 
put in place to monitor Telco’s 
efforts to comply with the 
strategic objectives of 
‘equivalence’ 
 
- ‘equivalence’ meant 
‘demonstrable achievement of 
key objectives’ by sharing 
necessary information but did 
not mean information 
overload, or being unduly 
punitive to demonstrate 
internal monitoring was even 
higher than mandated 
regulatory standard 
 
Illustration Evolving ESS 
“There was a bit of a debate 
about RAT overstepping its 
mark by asking these types of 
questions… we agreed what 
evidence we would submit.  
And some of the things they’re 
coming and asking for is kind 
of over and above that. And it 
is very much around whether 
the product’s fit for purpose 
rather than from a compliance 
point of view. We’ve learnt our 
lesson. Now we push back. We 
don’t give them information 
like that anymore” 
[Equivalence as demonstrable 
achievement via sharing 
necessary information] 
Effort to enact 
evolved ESS 
through 
reconfigured 
practices: New 
ways of 
explaining the 
key strategic 
objective of 
‘demonstrable’ 
equivalence; set 
out the purpose 
of RAT (i.e. to 
support, not 
hinder 
equivalence); 
teach people 
how to engage 
with RAT; 
instruct 
employees to 
share only 
necessary 
information on 
key objectives; 
bring in new 
‘compliance 
champions’; 
come up with a 
single point of 
contact. 
Telco delivers 
equivalence and 
products using 
refined RAT 
mechanism, and is 
able to get sign-off 
on these, but does 
experience some 
delay and 
penalties. 
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Case Story Espoused Strategy and 
Structure 
Performing 
Action Cycle 
Reinforcing 
Action Cycle 
Breakdown  Reflecting 
Action Cycle 
Evolving Espoused Strategy 
and Structure 
Performing 
Action Cycle 
Realized Radical 
Change 
#5 Working 
blind: 
Information 
system with 
no 
information 
Original ESS: The 
Equivalence Information 
System (EIS) was a new ICT 
system (structure) put in 
place to facilitate the 
‘independent’ ‘industry 
supplier’ AccessCo to deliver 
‘equivalence’ (strategy) 
through equal info sharing.  
 
- ‘independent’ was 
understood as AccessCo 
being ‘separate’ from 
RetailDivs and thus 
restricting access to 
AccessCo info 
- ‘industry supplier’ meant 
servicing all of industry  
- ‘equivalence’ was sharing 
the same basic information 
with RetailDivs and industry 
- ‘product’ meant making 
available new products and 
services, and info  
 
Illustration Original ESS 
“We don’t have the capacity 
to provide that information 
to everyone, so the only fair 
thing to do is to pull that 
information and approach 
this through a limited number 
of standard KCIs” 
[Equivalence as sharing the 
same basic information].  
Effort to enact 
ESS: Work to 
deliver equivalence 
in access to 
information by 
developing an EIS 
that shares same 
information with 
RetailDivs and 
external retailers; 
involved removing 
information from 
RetailDivs’ view. 
Issue three Key 
Customer 
Information 
(KCIs: issue 
received, engineer 
dispatched, issue 
resolved) 
 
Unintended 
consequence: 
Sharing vague info 
via EIS, which was 
also less info than 
previously being 
shared, made it 
hard to also 
provide quality 
services and 
adequate info to 
end-users; end-
users angry about 
lack of info; 
service staff work 
blind. 
Effort to 
reinforce 
practice: Reiterate 
key strategic 
objective of 
equivalence in 
access to info; 
affirm purpose of 
EIS as sharing 
same info with all 
retailers; hire 
customer service 
staff to manage 
interface; improve 
system around the 
same set of 
information, but 
focus on better 
delivery of that 
information; and 
engage in debriefs 
and end-user 
communications 
to explain changes. 
Unintended 
consequences 
escalate: EIS 
is insufficient 
as it does not 
provide the 
information 
that end-users 
are used to or 
need; reduced 
service levels 
and failed 
‘industry 
supplier’ 
objective by 
not servicing 
all of industry 
well. 
RetailDivs & 
end-users 
complain; 
media/regulato
ry scrutiny of 
issue; inability 
to coordinate 
and deliver 
services; high 
staff attrition 
and 
dissatisfaction. 
Effort to reflect 
on Mandate: 
Consider the role 
of information in 
overall Mandate; 
what is the spirit 
of the Mandate 
in terms of 
information 
quality, even if 
not equivalent; 
working group 
on systems and 
information 
sharing with 
relevant 
organizational 
groups; high-
level discussions 
with regulators 
and industry to 
work out what is 
desirable and 
feasible; explain 
to regulator 
potential 
industry service 
crisis and 
customer 
dissatisfaction. 
 
  
 
 
Shift in ESS: The Equivalence 
Information System (EIS) 
(structure) was put in place to 
facilitate the ‘independent’ 
‘industry supplier’ AccessCo to 
deliver ‘equivalence’ (strategy) 
through equal info sharing.  
 
- ‘independent’ was understood 
as AccessCo being ‘separate’ 
and thus restricting access to 
info that other industry retailers 
did not have access to 
-  ‘industry supplier’ meant 
servicing all of industry well, 
including RetailDivs  
- ‘equivalence’ was sharing the 
same detailed information with 
RetailDivs and external 
industry; i.e. the EIS to share 
operational info detailed 
enough to meet needs 
- ‘product’ meant making 
available new products and 
services, and high quality info  
 
Illustration Evolving ESS 
“The key issue was RetailDivs 
needing lots more information 
and AccessCo not wanting to 
give more information. The 
compromise was that there 
would be extra standardized 
messages. This was provided to 
all industry players” 
[Equivalence as sharing the 
same detailed information]. 
Effort to enact 
evolved ESS 
through 
reconfigured 
practices: 
Explain key 
strategic 
objective of 
equivalence in 
access to 
information to 
mean supplying 
more info to all 
retailers, not less 
to RetailDivs; 
explain purpose 
of EIS to share 
same detailed 
info; adding 
functionality; 
training CS 
managers on 
what info to 
share and how; 
delivering better 
info. Adapting 
info on EIS to 
consumer needs. 
Now 5 points of 
KCIs (issue 
received, 
estimated time 
of dispatch, 
engineer 
dispatched, 
initial diagnosis, 
issue resolved). 
Telco delivers 
equivalence and 
adequacy in 
relation to 
information using 
refined EIS 
mechanism, but 
only after key 
operational issues, 
complaints, and 
risk to reputation. 
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Case Story Espoused Strategy and 
Structure 
Performing 
Action Cycle 
Reinforcing 
Action Cycle 
Breakdown  Reflecting 
Action Cycle 
Evolving Espoused Strategy 
and Structure 
Performing 
Action Cycle 
Realized Radical 
Change 
#6 The 
Governator: 
New 
reporting and 
governance 
structure 
Original ESS: The 
Governator was a new 
governance structure put in 
place to facilitate 
‘equivalence’ and new quality 
‘products’ (strategy) by 
coordinating activity across 
deliveries. 
 
- ‘equivalence’ referred to 
implementing the change 
mandate quickly across a 
number of deliveries 
simultaneously   
- ‘product’ meant developing 
mandated products and 
services 
 
Illustration Original ESS 
“We want to drive reporting 
along governance lines. It’s a 
solutions-focused, vertical 
and business horizontals 
matrix approach to the 
program” [Equivalence as 
delivering across a number of 
deliveries] 
 
 
Effort to enact 
ESS: Deliver 
‘equivalence’ 
objective and 
ensure activities 
are aligned by 
developing a 
governing 
structure, with 
people and 
projects, spanning 
across deliveries. 
 
Unintended 
consequences: 
The Governator 
activities are not 
embedded in 
existing 
deliverables, made 
it hard to deliver 
the ‘equivalence’ 
objective of 
coordinating 
across deliveries; 
Lack of 
coordinating 
across portfolio; 
Project owners not 
clear; deliveries 
were delayed; 
service issues 
emerged; and work 
was duplicated. 
Effort to 
reinforce 
practice: Reiterate 
the key objective 
of achieving 
equivalence across 
a number of 
deliveries 
simultaneously; 
affirm purpose of 
Governator as 
coordinating 
activity across 
deliveries; release 
open comms 
about Governator; 
hire project leader; 
visit program and 
project teams to 
introduce 
Governator. 
Unintended 
consequences 
escalate: 
Governator is 
insufficient as 
it does not 
adequately link 
to existing 
programs and 
projects; 
hinders goal of 
‘equivalence’, 
i.e. implement 
change across 
deliveries 
simultaneously. 
Various 
parties, incl. 
RetailDivs, 
don’t 
understand 
Governator 
and complain; 
lots of double-
work taking 
place; no 
strong 
ownership; 
recurring issues 
across 
deliveries; and 
some deliveries 
fail. 
 
Effort to reflect 
on Mandate: 
Consider 
whether other 
strategic, 
structural and 
operational 
streamlining can 
take place 
without 
undermining 
principles of 
Mandate; as 
systems and 
structures are 
being revamped 
already, can this 
provide 
opportunities for 
additional 
efficiencies; can 
delivery of 
Mandate also 
incorporate 
improving 
strategic nature 
of offerings. 
 
Shift in ESS: The Governator 
was the new governance 
structure put in place to 
facilitate ‘equivalence’ and new 
quality ‘products’ (strategy) by 
coordinating activity across 
elaborated deliveries. 
 
- ‘equivalence’ referred to 
implementing the change 
mandate quickly and efficiently 
across a number of deliveries 
simultaneously 
- ‘product’ meant developing 
mandated and strategic 
products and services  
 
Illustration Evolving ESS 
“What’s different here is that 
it’s not just another effort to 
coordinate the Mandate; we’re 
also trying to use it as an 
opportunity to highlight new 
opportunities and become 
more efficient as a business.” 
[Equivalence as delivering 
efficiently across a number of 
deliveries] 
Effort to enact 
evolved ESS 
through 
reconfigured 
practices: 
Explain the key 
strategic 
objective of 
‘equivalence’ 
requiring a quick 
and efficient 
delivery to retain 
focus on 
commercial 
goals. Explain 
purpose as 
supporting not 
replacing existing 
programs; not 
undermining or 
eroding existing 
programs; work 
with structures 
and project leads 
to ensure 
coordination; 
add clear liaisons 
and leads; have 
open forums; 
assign owners; 
improve 
transparency to 
facilitate 
coordination and 
streamlining. 
Telco delivers 
equivalence in a 
way that meets 
mandated change, 
but goes beyond 
it; but only after 
some delivery 
failures, in-
fighting, and 
inefficient double-
working.  
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Figure 1. Overview of radical change: Key deadlines and breakdowns relating to Products A, B and C 
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Figure 2. Processual dynamics of realizing a mandated radical change across managerial levels 
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